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# Supreme Court, U.S.

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In The

# Supreme Court of the United States

IN RE CARLO E. JOHNSON,

Petitioner.

On Petition For Writ Of Mandamus To The United States District Court For The Eastern District Of Pennsylvania

## PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

CARLO E. JOHNSON 874 Douglass Ave. Elkins Park, Pa. 19027 215-886-8508 Pro Se Petitioner

# **QUESTION PRESENTED**

Where government officials submitted intentionally false information in U.S. District Court to obtain the decision in *Carlo Johnson v. Martin Dragovich et al.*, is petitioner entitled to relief under Rule 60 Section (b) clause (3) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?

#### LIST OF PARTIES

The respondents are Pennsylvania Governor Edward Rendell, Attorney General of Pennsylvania Tom Corbett, Philadelphia District Attorney of Philadelphia Lynn Abraham, Philadelphia Federal Prosecutor Thomas W. Dolgenos and Montgomery County Assistant District Attorney Robert M. Falin.

The petitioner's trial judge the Honorable Jane Cutler Greenspan received a copy but is not a respondent.

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#### PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

Petitioner Carlo E. Johnson respectfully pray that writ of mandamus issue to review the habeas corpus denial of the United States District Court which was affirmed by The United States Third Circuit Court Appeals.

#### **OPINIONS BELOW**

The Superior Court decision written by the Honorable Kate Ford Elliot is docketed as Journal Number J. E01004/98.

The decision of the United States District Court dated January 17, 2001 c.v. 00-1097 Carlo Johnson v. Martin Dragovich et al. is unreported. It is reproduced as Appendix A. P.A.C.E.R. records pertaining to June 26, 2001 habeas denial No. 01-1325 of the United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals are reproduced as Appendix B. July 26, 2007 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Order C.A. No. 07-2932 is reproduced as Appendix C.

# JURISDICTION

Pursuant the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriated in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to usages and principles of law.

#### STATUTE INVOLVED

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 section (d) clause (3) provide:

(b) "GROUNDS FOR RELIEF FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT, ORDER, OR PROCEEDING. On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;"

#### STATEMENT OF THE CASE

### A. Background

On January 17, 2001 petitioner Carlo Johnson was denied habeas corpus relief from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The decision of the District Court affirms a conviction of third degree murder based on the opinion written by the Honorable Kate Ford Elliot of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania (Journal Number J. E01004/98). The order written by the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> We find that the Commonwealth's circumstantial evidence amply establishes that appellant was guilty of conspiracy to commit third-degree murder. Appellant knew throughout the night of November 11, 1994 that his cohorts from the Abington group were planning to commit violent attacks on members of the Fox Chase group (pg.13 J. E01004/98).

Honorable Judge Clarence C. Newcomer states in his footnote,

"A panel of the Superior Court also determined that it could not address his sufficiency of the evidence argument. Accordingly it vacated petitioner's sentence and remanded the case for clarification of the conspiracy charge for which he was convicted. However, the Commonwealth petitioned for en banc Reargument, and the Superior Court granted the petition. Upon Reargument, the Superior Court held that there was sufficient evidence to support petitioner's conviction for conspiracy". (pg,4 Order Approving and Adopting Report and Recommendation Dismissing petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus c.v.00-1097 Carlo Johnson v. Martin Dragovich et al.)<sup>2</sup> (Appendix A)

On June 26, 2001 a panel of the United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Authoring Judge Thomas L. Ambro, agrees with the findings of the District Court stating in the denial, "we find, for essentially the same reasons given by the District court in denying his petition, that the denial has

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The Report and Recommendation contained in **Appendix A** states, "The Superior Court granted reargument. The Court ultimately agreed with the Commonwealth that the object of the conspiracy was to murder Eddie Polec, and held there was sufficient evidence to support Mr. Johnson's conviction for conspiracy. Id. at 791" (pg.4 Report and Recommendation 12/1/2000 No. 00-1097 Carlo Johnson v. Martin Dragovich, et al.).

failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. Section 2253(c)(2)."<sup>3</sup> (P.A.C.E.R. attachment Docket No. 01-1325) (Appendix B)

On July 26, 2007 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Authoring Judge Morton I. Greenberg, denied petitioner's second and successive habeas corpus petition stating,

"The foregoing application to file a second or successive 2254 petition is denied. Johnson has failed to make a prima facie showing that: (1) the claim relies on a retroactively applicable "new rule" of constitutional law; or (2) "the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense." See 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2) Order (C.A. No. 07-2932) (Appendix C)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Circuit Judge Maryanne Trump Barry violated Internal Operating Procedure 26.1.2 Notice of Possible Judicial Disqualification. The Honorable Barry sat on panel No. 01-1325 June 26, 2001 and related case *Anthony Rienze v. Frank Gills, et al.* No. 05-3349 (10/24/2005) Authoring Judge Samuel Alito.

#### B. The Decisions Below

The decisions rendered by The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirm fraudulent information supplied by Commonwealth's Attorneys. The opinion cited in petitioner's habeas corpus denial. J. E01004/98 written by the Honorable Kate Ford Elliot of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania dated October 23, 1998 only applied to petitioner's codefendants at: Commonwealth v. Crook 1194PHL96. Commonwealth v. Pinero 1281PHL96, Commonwealth v. Rienzi 1324PHL96, Commonwealth v. Alexander 1325PHL96, and Commonwealth Khathavong 1470PHL96, according to the Atlantic Reporter, 2d Series. Footnoted beside each of petitions co-defendants states. "A petition for reargument was filed and granted at No. 1425PHL96. The petition for reargument was granted on February 26, 1998. Therefore, this decision is only for the cases at: 1194, 1281, 1324, 1325 and 1470 PHL 96." (Pages of the Atlantic Reporter, 2d Series) (Exhibit A)

#### REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. Montgomery County Assistant District Attorney Robert M. Falin and Philadelphia Federal Prosecutor Thomas W. Dolgenos Committed Fraud in U.S. Court of Appeals

According to the Atlantic Reporter, 2d Series opinion J. E01004/98 (October 23, 1998) is only for the cases at: 1194, 1281, 1324, 1325 and 1470 PHL96. The Attorneys for the Commonwealth used this opinion in U.S. Federal Court as if it overturned or revered the Per Curiam Order dated 12/16/1997 of the Superior Court.

On December 16, 1997 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated, and remanded petitioner's sentence for further clarification of the conspiracy charge (Journal number: J-A45026-97). The Per Curiam order of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania states,

"In his appeal, appellant Johnson argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for Conspiracy, His argument is based on his contention that he was convicted of conspiracy to commit third degree murder. However, our review of the record reveals that Johnson was never charged with conspiracy to commit murder. The Criminal information filed by the Commonwealth

<sup>&#</sup>x27;The information pages filed by the Commonwealth and the certified trial court record contained in **Exhibit C** supports the decision of the Original panel of the Superior Court.

against Johnson stated only that Johnson and others agreed with others to commit a crime, and denied the criminal objective as "to beat Eddie Polec." Nowhere in the information filed against Johnson was there an allegation regarding a conspiracy to kill or murder Polec. As the information did not allege the crime of conspiracy to commit murder. Johnson could not have been convicted of such a crime. "The law is clear that a defendant cannot be convicted of an offense which is not the accusation made against him." "Commonwealth v. Speller, 311 Pa. Super. 569, 579, 458 A.2d 198, 203 (1983): Pa.R.Crim.P.225(d) ("In all cases tried on an information, the issues at trial shall be defined by such information" (pg.26-28 J-A45026-97). (Exhibit B)

Under U.S. Code Title 18: Section 1018. Official certificates or writings, the Commonwealth Attorneys committed a crime of fraud.<sup>5</sup>

"Whoever, being a public officer or other person authorized by any law of the United States to make or give a certificate or other writing, knowingly makes and delivers as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The prosecutors knew the official outcome of the State appellate courts. Further proof of the fraud is contained in **Exhibit D.** The Commonwealth copied the signature of the original court order to the opinion of the Honorable Kate Ford Elliot. The signatures are not contained in the attached Appendix, but can be found on the original documents sent to the Court.

true such a certificate or writing, containing any statement which he knows to be false, in a case where the punishment thereof is not elsewhere expressly provided by law, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both."

Montgomery County A.D.A Robert M. Falin and Philadelphia Federal Prosecutor Thomas W. Dolgenos represented the respondents in the matter of c.v. 00-1097 Carlo Johnson v. Martin Dragovich et al. These prosecutors knew the respondents had no information holding petitioner for murder.

Fraud, by contrast, is the intentional misstatement or omission of a material fact made with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard for whether it is true or false. E.g., SEC v. Infinity Group Co., 212 F.3d 180, 191-92 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 905 (2001) (actionable securities fraud consists of knowing or reckless misstatements or (omissions); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197 & n.12 (3d Cir. 1979) (same, collecting cases). Fraud is both a criminal and civil law concept. Unlike perjury, fraud does not depend upon an affirmative false statement; it may rest upon an omission to state a material fact that the actor is under a duty to disclose or that is necessary to make the facts stated not misleading. Bronston v. U.S., 409 U.S. 352, 358 n.4 (1973) (criminal fraud, unlike perjury, "goes 'rather far in punishing intentional creation of false impressions by a selection of literally true representations, because the actor himself generally selects and arranges the

representations'") (citation omitted); Kline v. First Western Gov't Sec., 24 F.3d 480, 491 (3d Cir. 1994); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1314 (6th Cir. 1974). Fraud also does not require that the actor know his statements and omissions to be false; the actor may answer for fraud if he acts in reckless disregard for whether his statements and omissions are true or not. Infinity Group Co., 212 F.3d at 191-92; First Commodity Corp. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm., 676 F.2d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1982).

# II. The U.S. District Court and U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals Violated Petitioner's Constitutional Rights of Due Process of Law

The decisions rendered by both U.S. Federal Courts held petitioner accountable for the crime of criminal conspiracy to commit third degree murder. Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to criminal conspiracy to commit aggravated assault. The decisions of the U.S. Federal Courts affirm a statutory increase in punishment which is impermissible ex post facto law. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990). The Due Process Clause does not permit retroactive judicial decisions. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867); Carnell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000). Retroactive procedural statutes that work to deny a defense, bar the practice of law, increase punishment, or increase the likelihood of conviction may violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.

According to the notes of testimony, at sentencing petitioner's trial judge the Honorable Jane Cutler Greenspan stated,

"The only convictions here, in this entire case, from this same jury were as to Mr. Polec. So, as to whether it was Conspiracy to commit Aggravated Assault, or Conspiracy to commit Murder, I may have a question, but there is no question, given the fact that they came back with a not guilty as to Mr. Stuber there is no question that the Conspiracy applies, at a minimum, to Aggravated Assault, F-1. There is no question of that (pg. 362 N.T. 3/19/1996)." (Exhibit E)

Also, contained in Exhibit E are prison records and criminal history report from the Pennsylvania State Police which states petitioner was incarcerated for criminal conspiracy to commit aggravated assault not third degree murder. The inferior courts ignored facts of the trial court record, state appellate court records and the prison records holding petitioner.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Both U.S. Federal Courts allowed Montgomery County A.D.A Robert M. Falin to represent the Commonwealth in habeas corpus Carlo Johnson v. Martin Dragovich et al. and Anthony Rienze v. Frank Gills, et al. in clear violation Rule 18 of FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. Montgomery County did not formally charge Carlo Johnson or Anthony Rienze in the death of Edward Polec.

# III. This Court Should Provide Petitioner a Remedy for the Government's Fraud

The fraud in this case occurred in United States District Court and was perpetuated in United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals by the Commonwealth. Petitioner is unable to overcome the judicial bias of the court created by the fraudulent information and call for this Court to exercise its Supervisory Powers. Proof of bias can be found in petitioner's complaint denial from the Judicial Council of The Third Circuit. Chief Judge Scirica writes,

"This is a complaint filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 351 against United States Magistrate Judge (Respondent). Complainant is a prisoner serving a state sentence for a conviction involving a homicide.

Respondent entered a Report and Recommendation in 2000 recommending that habeas corpus petition filed by Complainant be denied. The District Judge approved and accepted that Recommendation and dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Third Circuit denied a certificate of appealability." (pg. 1 MEMORANDUM OPINION J.C. No. 07-18 date 8/2/2007)<sup>7</sup> (Appendix C)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The Honorable Faith Angell wrote both report and recommendations in the matter of Carlo Johnson v. Martin Dragovich et al. and Anthony Rienze v. Frank Gills, et al. in violation Internal Operating Procedure 26.1.2 Notice of Possible Judicial Disqualification.

The Honorable Chief Scirica's statement, "Complainant is a prisoner serving a state sentence for a conviction involving a homicide," clearly displays the bias of the Court. The information contained in the complaint (Exhibits A-D) to the Judicial Council more than adequately showed that not only was petitioner not a prisoner, it also illustrated the fact that petitioner severed a sentence for assault not homicide. Petitioner believes the inferior courts are not inclined to review any information which renders the Commonwealth's case invalid. It is in these unusual circumstances that an extraordinary writ such as the writ of coram nobis is appropriate to correct fundamental errors and prevent injustice. See United States v. Correa-De Jesus, 708 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1983).

#### CONCLUSION

This case involves a fraud which occurred in the U.S. Federal Courts. Petitioner's conviction was vacated and remanded on 12/16/1997. The Commonwealth used information it knew to be false to deny petitioner habeas corpus relief in 2001 for the same sentence which was vacated four years prior. One could argue a number of violations of civil and constitutional rights committed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania involving this case, but the fraud upon the U.S. Courts is apparent. The fact that petitioner received habeas corpus denials from the United States District Court and the United States Court

of Appeals for the Third Circuit after petitioner's sentence was vacated is proof itself.

For all these reasons the petition for writ of mandamus should be granted.

Respectfully submitted, CARLO E. JOHNSON 874 Douglass Ave. Elkins Park, Pa. 19027

Pro Se Petitioner

#### APPENDIX A

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CARLO JOHNSON

: CIVIL ACTION

v.

MARTIN DRAGOVICH, et al. NO. 00-1097

## REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

M. FAITH ANGELL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE December 1, 2000

Presently before this Court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed, pursuant to U.S.C. §2254, by a state prisoner. Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution ["SCI"] Mahoney in Frackville, Pennsylvania, where he is servicing a five to ten year sentence for criminal conspiracy for his role in a murder. For the reasons which follow, it is recommended that the instant habeas petition be denied without an evidentiary hearing.

# BACKGROUND1

On January 31, 1996, a jury presided over by the Honorable Jane Cutler Greenspan of the Philadelphia

The facts in this discussion have been taken from Mr. Johnson's habeas petition, the response of the District Attorney of Philadelphia County, and the state court records.

Court of Common Pleas, convicted petitioner of criminal conspiracy for his role in the murder of sixteen-year old Eddie Polec.<sup>2</sup> Judge Greenspan sentenced Mr. Johnson to a term of imprisonment of five to ten years and fined him \$15,000.

The facts underlying Mr. Johnson's conviction were described by the Superior Court as follows:

On November 4, 1994, an argument occurred in the Fox Chase section of Philadelphia between a group of teenagers from Abington and a group of teenagers from Fox Chase. One of the Abington teenagers, Jessica Simons, told Bou Khathavong about the incident. During the following week, Khathavong recruited a group of people from Abington to go to Fox Chase to seek revenge.

On November 11, 1994, Anthony Rienzi, Kevin Convey, and other teenagers went to Philadelphia to purchase marijuana. A short time later, Rienzi and Convey met Khathavong and appellant. Khathavong told the group he wanted to meet some of the people who usually gathered at the Fox Chase Recreation Center at a McDonald's at 10:30 p.m.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Mr. Johnson was tried jointly with five other defendants all of whom were convicted of conspiracy. Johnson was charged with various offenses, including criminal homicide, aggravated assault, recklessly endangering another person, and criminal conspiracy against victims Richard Stuber and Eddie Polec, but was only convicted of criminal conspiracy with respect to victim Eddie Polec.

Appellant, Khathavong, Rienzi, and Convey then went to Thomas Crook's house to recruit more people for the fight they expected to occur at the McDonald's, with Khathavong in particular calling people for this purpose. While at Crook's house, appellant talked about 'curbing' somebody, which he explained to mean that 'if somebody was laying down on their stomach, he would open their mouth up over the corner of the curb and kick down the back of their head.' (Notes of Testimony, 1/23/96 at 25-26.) After the group left Crook's house in two cars, Nicholas Pinero joined the group in his car. The three cars then went from the McDonald's to Rob Cofield's house. Cofield was not at home. While the group was waiting in the street for Cofield, appellant walked two houses up the street to Sonny Castorina's house and retrieved two wooden baseball bats. (Id. at 33.) The car containing Rienzi and Convey also contained a baseball bat.

While these events were occurring, a group of teenagers including the victim, was gathering at the Recreation Center. At approximately 9:30 p.m., some members of this group went to McDonald's, where they encountered some of the Abington teenagers. The Fox Chase group fled, and at some point the Abington group got out of their cars and began pursuit. Dewan Alexander and Nicholas Pinero hit victim John Atkinson with a baseball bat, then hit Matt Malone when he tried to assist Atkinson. Appellant slammed another victim, Richard Stuber, to the

ground. Stuber also suffered head injuries from a broken bottle. The group from Abington got back in their cars and drove around looking for more Fox Chase teenagers. They exited at St. Cecilia's Church, where they encountered Eddie Polec and his brother Billy. Convey swung a baseball bat at Eddie Polec. and though he missed. Polec fell while trying to avoid the attack. Once on the ground, Polec was struck several times by Convey. Crook, Rienzi, Alexander, and Pinero then gathered around. Rienzi hit Polec in the head with the bat, then picked up Polec and held him while Pinero hit Polec in the face and head several times with a bat. Alexander kicked Polec several times in the head with the steel-toed boots he was wearing. The group then fled the scene, leaving Polec mortally wounded; he died the next morning.

Appellant stood trial for several weeks in January 1996 along with co-defendants Crook, Pinero, Rienzi, Alexander, and Khathavong. Convey pleaded guilty and testified on behalf of the Commonwealth. On February 5, 1996, Crook, Pinero, and Rienzi were found guilty of third degree murder and criminal conspiracy with respect to Mr. Polec (Notes of Testimony, 2/5/96 at 21, 26, 33.) Alexander was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter and criminal conspiracy with respect to Mr. Polec. Id. at 29.) Khathavong was found guilty of criminal conspiracy.

Appellant was convicted of criminal conspiracy with respect to Mr. Polec, and was acquitted of all other charges (*Id.* at 25.)

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 781-82 (Pa. Super. 1998).

Mr. Johnson appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. On appeal he raised numerous claims of error. A panel of the Superior Court found no merit in most of the issues presented by Mr. Johnson, but determined that it could not address his sufficiency of the evidence argument. Id. at 782. Mr. Johnson's sentence was vacated and remanded for a clarification of the conspiracy charge for which he was convicted. Id. The panel reasoned that "because the Commonwealth's criminal information defined the criminal objective of appellant's alleged conspiracy as 'to beat Edward Polec', appellant was never charged with conspiracy to commit murder." Id.

The Commonwealth petitioned for en banc reargument, reasoning that there was no need for a remand because it was clear that the information charged Mr. Johnson with conspiracy to commit murder. Id. at 783. The Superior Court granted reargument. The Court ultimately agreed with the Commonwealth that the object of the conspiracy was to murder Eddie Polec, and held there was sufficient evidence to support Mr. Johnson's conviction for conspiracy. Id. at 791.

Other issues raised on appeal, according to the en banc Superior Court, included the following claims:

(1) the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct when he referred both during his opening statement and closing argument to a co-defendant's confession which was never introduced at trial: (2) the prosecutor engaged in a series of acts which constitute prosecutorial misconduct during his closing to the jury, the cumulative effect of which was to deny Johnson a fair and impartial trial; (3) the trial court erred by not granting a defense request for a mistrial during the prosecutor's closing argument: and (4) the actions and comments of the trial court demonstrated bias and prejudice requiring a new trial or a re-sentencing hearing for Johnson. Id. at 783-84. The en banc Superior Court considered and rejected all claims of error, affirming the judgment of sentence. Id. at 791.

A Petition for Allowance of Appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, was filed on or about November 23, 1998, in which Mr. Johnson claimed that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for criminal conspiracy and that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing argument. In an Order dated June 25, 1998, the Supreme Court declined to review the case. Commonwealth v. Johnson No. 594 E. D. Alloc. Dkt. 1998 (Pa. 1998).

On February 18, 2000, Mr. Williams filed the instant habeas petition. As grounds for relief, he argues one claim: "Petitioner was denied due process of law by the prosecutor's venomous summation that compared his attorney to Hitler and Goebbels and his defense to 'the Big Lie'".

In responding to the instant habeas petition, the Commonwealth argues: (1) the claim is procedurally defaulted because petitioner did not raise it as a due process violation in state court, and (2) petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

#### DISCUSSION

# A. Exhaustion/Procedural Default

The exhaustion rule, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254<sup>3</sup>, requires a federal court to postpone habeas

(Continued on following page)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The exhaustion requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provide:

<sup>(</sup>b)(1) An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that

<sup>(</sup>A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or

<sup>(</sup>B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or

<sup>(</sup>ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

<sup>(2)</sup> An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.

<sup>(3)</sup> A State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.

corpus jurisdiction, absent exceptional circumstances, until "the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State." The exhaustion requirement is rooted in considerations of comity; the statute is designed to protect the role of the state court in enforcement of federal law and to prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings. Rose v. Lundy, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1203 (1982); Castille v. Peoples, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 1059 (1989).

In order to demonstrate compliance with the exhaustion requirement, a habeas petitioner must show that each claim which forms the basis of his federal habeas petition has been "fairly presented" to the State courts. Castille v. Peoples, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 1059 (1989); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). Absent exceptional circumstances, the petitioner must first present all of his constitutional claims to the trial court, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania and then the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania before seeking relief in federal court. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. at 275 (1971); Swanger v. Zimmerman, 750 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1984).

The burden is on the habeas petitioner to prove all facts which entitle him to a discharge from custody, including the facts relevant to the exhaustion

<sup>(</sup>c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.

requirement. Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208, 1218 (3d Cir. 1987).

In the instant case, I find that Mr. Johnson's prosecutorial misconduct claim has been properly exhausted for habeas purposes, as it was presented on direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Third Circuit stated in Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, "that when deciding whether a federal claim has been fairly presented, 'the appropriate focus . . . centers on the likelihood that the presentation in state court alerted that tribunal to the claim's federal quality and approximate contours." Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, 959 F.2d 1227, 1232 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).

Having reviewed the state court records, and, in particular, the allocatur brief, I find that the argument presented is sufficient to alert the state Supreme Court that Mr. Johnson was asserting a due process claim. Thus, I find that the claim has been properly exhausted and will address the merits of the prosecutorial misconduct claim.

<sup>&#</sup>x27;The prosecution contends that although the petitioner presented the facts of his claim to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, he failed to present the legal theory that he advances in the federal habeas petition; namely, that the prosecutor's alleged misconduct rose to the level of a due process violation.

# B. Merits

## 1. Standard of Review

Because Mr. Johnson's habeas petition was filed after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA")<sup>5</sup>, the amended habeas standards apply to this case.

In the instant case, Mr. Johnson's claims were considered, and rejected, on the merits by the Superior Court on direct appeal. AEDPA precludes habeas relief on "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim –

- (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
- (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

In interpreting the above language, the Third Circuit has discussed the appropriate degree of deference which the AEDPA requires a federal habeas court to accord a state court's construction of federal constitutional issues and interpretation of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Pub.L.No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1219 (1996), effective date April 24, 1996.

Supreme Court precedent. See Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 73 (1999). The Third Circuit has held that under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a two step inquiry is warranted. The majority agreed that:

- (1) The proper initial inquiry for the habeas court is whether the state court decision was "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent that governs the petitioner's claim. Relief is appropriate only when the petitioner shows that "Supreme Court precedent requires an outcome contrary to that reached by the relevant state court." *Matteo*, 171 F.3d at 891.
- (2) In the absence of such a showing, the habeas court then must ask whether the state court decision represents an "unreasonable application of" Supreme Court precedent. This inquiry is an objective one, namely, "whether the state court decision, evaluated objectively and on the merits, resulted in an outcome that cannot reasonably be justified." *Matteo*, 171 F.3d at 891.

In a recent opinion, the United States Supreme Court discussed the scope of habeas review after AEDPA. See Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000). According to the Williams majority:

We [the Supreme Court Justices] all agree that state-court judgments must be upheld unless, after the closest examination of the state-court judgment, a federal court is firmly convinced that a federal constitutional right has been violated.... In sum, the [AEDPA] statute directs federal courts to attend every state-court judgment with utmost care, but it does not require them to defer to the opinion of every reasonable state-court judge on the content of federal law. If after carefully weighing all the reasons for accepting a state court's judgment, a federal court is convinced that a prisoner's custody...violates the Constitution, that independent judgment should prevail.

Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1511.

# 2. Prosecutorial Misconduct Standard

The Supreme Court has held that federal habeas relief may be granted when the "prosecutorial misconduct may 'so infect the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974)). The Court also stated that for due process to have been offended, "the prosecutorial misconduct must be 'of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial." Id. (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). The appropriate standard of review for such a claim on writ of habeas corpus is the "narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory power." Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 642.

It is not enough, however, that the prosecutorial misconduct "is undesirable, erroneous, or even 'universally condemned." Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643 (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 1010 141 (1973)). In evaluating whether the remarks of the prosecutor rise to the level of a constitutional violation, the remarks must be evaluated in the context of the whole trial. Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1239 (3d Cir. 1992). The remarks must be sufficiently prejudicial in the context of the entire trial to violate a petitioner's due process rights. Greer, 483 U.S. at 766 (citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. at 639).

3. The Superior Court's Decision Rejecting the Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim is Neither Contrary to, Nor an Unreasonable Application of Established Law.

Mr. Johnson claims that he was "denied due process of law by the prosecutor's venomous summation that compared his attorney<sup>6</sup> to Hitler and Goebbels and his defense to 'the Big Lie'", and, therefore, is entitled to a new trial.

The Superior Court rejected this claim stating that the reference to "the Big Lie" was an attempt by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The trial transcript reveals, regarding "the Big Lie" reference, that the prosecutor was not referring specifically to Mr. Johnson's attorney, but to the attorney for co-defendant Khathavong. See (N.T. 1/30/96, 110).

the prosecution had manufactured evidence and manipulated witnesses. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 710 A.2d 778, 789 (Pa. Super. 1998). According to the state court, the reference to the "the Big Lie" does not "in and of itself exceed the bounds of oratorical flair." Id. The court also stated that "specific comparisons between counsel's tactics and those of Hitler and Goebbels were reprehensible, even in the heat of closing arguments." Id. at 789-790. Nevertheless, the Superior Court found "no reversible error in that the trial court carefully and forcefully instructed the jury to disregard such comments." Id. at 790.

The Superior Court's analysis is consistent with the standard of prosecutorial misconduct determined by the United States Supreme Court. The prosecutor's remarks were not sufficiently prejudicial in context of the entire trial to violate Mr. Johnson's due process rights. See Greer, 483 U.S. at 766 (citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. at 639). There is no support that the Superior Court's ruling was contrary to clearly established Federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court.

Mr. Johnson has also failed to demonstrate that the Superior Court ruling was an incorrect and an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has not addressed a case that is directly on point to the case at hand. However, several lower federal courts have decided similar claims in the same manner that Mr. Johnson's case was resolved by the Superior Court.

See Kirk v. Petrelli, 331 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (curative instructions regarding the prosecutor's reference to defense counsel using Hitler's tactic of telling repeated lies did not amount to a constitutional violation.); United States v. Sailor, 831 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1987) (prosecutor's reference to "the big lie" was simply not reversible error); Fussell v. Morris, 884 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1986) (prosecutor's comment that the defendant had mastered the technique of "the big lie" and comparison to Hitler, although improper, did not render the trial fundamentally unfair); United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir.1990) (prosecutor's accusation that defendant had adopted Hitler's strategy of lying repeatedly did not rise to the level of reversible trial error).

Applying the habeas guidelines, post AEDPA, I found that Petitioner has not met his burden of showing that "Supreme Court precedent requires an outcome contrary to that reached by the relevant state court". Nor, did the state court's decision result in an outcome that cannot reasonably be justified. See *Matteo*, 171 F.3d at 891 (3d Cir. 1999). The Superior Court concluded that the prosecutor's comments was not reversible error since the trial court "carefully and forcefully instructed the jury to disregard such comments." *Commonwealth v. Johnson*,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The curative instructions given by the trial court were as follows:

Members of the jury, before I begin my final charge to you, I want to give you cautionary instructions with (Continued on following page)

719 A.2d 778, 790 (Pa. Super. 1998). This conclusion, which is an objectively reasonable application of the federal standard, is binding on the habeas court.

# RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons stated above, it is recommended that Petitioner's habeas claim be DENIED AND DISMISSED WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEAR-ING. It is further recommended a finding be made that there is no probable cause to issue a certificate of appealability.

#### BY THE COURT:

/s/ M. Faith Angell
M. FAITH ANGELL
UNITED STATES
MAGISTRATE JUDGE

regard to Mr. Casey's closing. In his argument, Mr. Casey may have referred to, I believe, blood lust, Hitler, Goebbels, the big lie and predators. Any such mention of any such words by Mr. Casey was improper and must be stricken by you and totally ignored by you.

<sup>(</sup>N.T. 1/31/96, 18-19).

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CARLO JOHNSON,

: CIVIL ACTION

Petitioner,

.

V.

:

MARTIN DRAGOVICH,

ET AL..

: NO. 00-1097

Respondents.

#### ORDER

(Filed Jan. 17, 2001)

AND NOW, this 17th day of January, 2001, upon consideration of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, as filed by Petitioner, and after review of the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge M. Faith Angell, and Petitioner's objections thereto, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

- 1. The Report and Recommendation is AP-PROVED and ADOPTED.
- 2. The petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is DISMISSED.
- 3. A Certificate of appealability is DENIED.

## I. BACKGROUND

On January 31, 1996, a jury presided over by the Honorable Jane Cutler Greenspan convicted petitioner of criminal conspiracy for his role in the murder of sixteen year old Eddie Polec in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. Petitioner was tried jointly with five other defendants, all of whom were convicted. While petitioner was conviced of criminal conspiracy, he was also charged with criminal homicide, aggravated assault, recklessly endangering another person. Judge Greenspan sentenced petitioner to five to ten years imprisonment and fined him \$15,000.

The Superior Court described the facts underlying petitioner's conviction as follows:

On November 4, 1994, an argument occurred in the Fox Chase section of Philadelphia between a group of teenagers from Abington and a group of teenagers from Fox Chase. One of the Abington teenagers, Jessica Simons, told Bou Khathavong about the incident. During the following seek, Khathavong recruited a group of people from Abington to go to Fox Chase to seek revenge.

On November 11, 1994, Anthony Rienzi, Kevin Convey, and other teenagers went to Philadelphia to purchase marijuana. A short time later, Rienzi and Convey met Khathavong and appellant. Khathavong told the group he wanted to meet some of the people who usually gathered at the Fox Chase Recreation Center at a McDonald's at 10:30 p.m. Appellant, Khathavong, Rienzi, and Convey then went to Thomas Crook's house to recruit more people for the fight they expected to occur at the McDonald's, with Khathavong

in particular calling people for this purpose. While at Crook's house, appellant talked about 'curbing' somebody, which he explained to mean that 'if somebody was laying down on their stomach, he would open their mouth up over the corner of the curb and kick down the back of their head.' (Notes of Testimony, 1/23/96, at 25-26). After the group left Crook's house in two cars, Nicholas Pinero joined the group in his car. The three cars then went from the McDonald's to Rob Cofield's house. Cofield was not at home. While the group was waiting in the street for Cofield, appellant walked two houses up the street to Sonny Castorina's house and retrieved two wooden baseball bats. (Id. At 33). The car containing Rienzi and Convey also contained a baseball bat.

While these events were occurring, a group of teenagers, including the victim, was gethering at the Recreation Center. At approximately 9:30 p.m., some members of this group went to McDonald's, where they encountered some of the Abington teenagers. The Fox Chase group fled, and at some point the Abington group got out of their cars and began pursuit. Dewan Alexander and Nicholas Pinero hit victim John Atkinson with a baseball bat, then hit Matt Malone when he tried to assist Atkinson. Appellant slammed another victim, Richard Stuber, to the ground. Stuber also suffered head injuries from a broken bottle. The group from Abington got back in their cars and drove around looking for more Fox Chase teenagers. They exited at St. Cecilia's Church, where they encountered Eddie Polec and his brother Billy. Convey swung a baseball bat at Eddie Polec, and though he missed, Polec fell while trying to avoid the attack. Once on the ground, Polec was struck several times by Convey. Crook, Rienzi, Alexander, and Pinero then gathered around. Rienzi hit Polec in the head with the bat, then picked up Polec and held him while Pinero hit Polec in the face and head several times with a bat. Alexander kicked Polec several times in the head with the steel-toed boots he was wearing. The group then fled the scene, leaving Polec mortally wounded; he died the next morning.

Appellant stood trial for several weeks in January 1996 along with co-defendants Crook, Pinero, Rienzi, Alexander, and Khathavong. Convey pleaded guilty and testified on behalf of the Commonwealth. On February 5, 1996, Crook, Pinero, and Rienzi were found guilty of third degree murder and criminal conspiracy with respect to Mr. Polec (Notes of Testimony, 2/5/96 at 21, 26, 33). Alexander was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter and criminal conspiracy with respect to Mr. Polec. (Id. At 29). Khathavong was found guilty of criminal conspiracy.

Appellant was convicted of criminal conspiracy with respect to Mr. Polec, and was acquitted of all other charges. (*Id.* at 25).

After his trial, petitioner appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court where a panel of judges

found no merit to most of petitioner's arguments, including the one he raises today – that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing argument.<sup>1</sup>

Thereafter, petitioner filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court where Mr. Johnson claimed that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for criminal conspiracy, and that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. In an Order dated June 25, 1998, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declined to review the case.

On February 18, 2000, petitioner filed the instant habeas petition. Thereafter, United States Magistrate Judge M. Faith Angel filed her report and recommendation that petitioner's habeas petition be denied. Consequently, petitioner filed his objections to the magistrate report where he raises one claim: that petitioner was denied due process of law by the prosecutor's summation that compared his attorney to Hitler and Goebbels and his defense to "the big lie." Thus, that is the issue the Court now addresses.

A panel of the Superior Court also determined that it could not address his sufficiency of the evidence argument. Accordingly it vacated petitioner's sentence and remanded the case for clarification of the conspiracy charge for which he was convicted. However, the Commonwealth petitioned for en banc reargument, and the Superior Court granted the petition. Upon reargument, the Superiour Court held that there was sufficient evidence to support petitioner's conviction for conspiracy.

### II. DISCUSSION

If a party files timely written objections to the magistrate's findings and recommendation, this Court must conduct a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

Accordingly, when a party applies for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the judgment of a State court shall not disturbed with respect to any claim it adjudicated on the merits unless the State court's decision "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).<sup>2</sup>

The Third Circuit has explained that section 2254(d)(1) requires a two-step analysis:

First, the federal habeas court must determine whether the state court decision was 'contrary to' Supreme Court precedent that governs the petitioner's claim. Relief is appropriate only if the petitioner shows that 'Supreme Court precedent requires an outcome contrary to that reached by the relevant state court.' In the absence of such a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Because petitioner filed his habeas petition after the effective date of the Antiterorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) applies here.

showing, the federal habeas court must ask whether the state court decision represents an 'unreasonable application' of Supreme Court precedent: that is, whether the state court decision, evaluated objectively and on the merits, resulted in an outcome that cannot reasonably be justified. If so, then the petition should be granted.

Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 891 (3rd Cir. 1999), cert. denied, Matteo v. Brennan, 528 U.S. 824 (1999) (citations omitted).

Here, petitioner objects to Magistrate Judge Angel's conclusion that the Pennsylvania Superior Court reasonably resolved his claim that he was denied due process when the prosecutor's summation compared petitioner's attorney to Hitler and Goebbels and his defense to "the big lie."

The Supreme Court has stated that federal habeas relief may only be granted where prosecutorial misconduct may "so infec[t] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). To constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be "of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial." Miller, 483 U.S. at 765 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985)). However, the mere fact that the prosecutorial misconduct is undesirable, erroneous or even universally condemned is insufficient. See Donnely, 416 U.S. at 643.

In this case, the Court finds that the Superior Court's analysis is consistent [with] Supreme Court precedent concerning prosecutorial misconduct and due process. Additionally, the Court is not persuaded that the Superiour Court ruling was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. The Superior Court rejected petitioner's claim that the prosecutor's comments amounted to reversible error when it found that while the prosecutor's comments were reprehensible, the trial court carefully and forcefully instructed the jury to disregard those comments. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 789-90 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). Moreover, the Superior Court determined that the prosecutor's reference to "the big lie" was an attempt to respond to defense arguments that the prosecution had manufactured evidence and manipulated witnesses. Under these circumstances, the Court is convinced that the Superior Court's decision was consistent with Supreme Court precedent concerning prosecutorial misconduct and due process, and can be reasonably justified. See Matteo, 171 F.3d at 891.

In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court will deny the petitioner's petition.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED

/s/ Clarence C. Newcomer Clarence C. Newcomer, S.J.

#### APPENDIX B

Appeal From: U.S. District Court for the District of Eastern Pennsylvania

### **Case Type Information:**

- 1) civil
- 2) private
- 3) Habeas corpus

## **Originating Court Information:**

District: 0313-2:00-cv-01097

Magistrate Judge: M. Faith Angell

Date Filed: 03/01/2000

Date Order/Judgment: Date NOA Filed:

11/03/2000 11/13/2000

11/16/2000 CIVIL CASE DOCKETED. Notice filed by Carolyn A. Bryant.

11/16/2000 RECORD, received.

11/16/2000 TRANSCRIPT PURCHASE ORDER (PART I), no proceedings in District Court.

11/21/2000 ATTORNEY NOT PARTICIPATING: Norris E. Gelman advises that he will not participate in this appeal, received. [SEND TO MERITS PANEL]

11/27/2000 STAFF ATTORNEY LETTER SENT advising appeal has been listed for possible dismissal due to jurisdictional defect.

12/01/2000 APPEARANCE from Attorney Thomas W. Dolgenos on behalf of Appellees, filed.

12/11/2000 RESPONSE to Staff Attorney's letter for possible dismissal due to jurisdictional

defect by Appellant, filed. Certificate of Service dated 12/11/00.

01/30/2001 ORDER (Chief Judge Becker, Authoring Judge, Weis and Garth, Circuit Judges) Appellant Carolyn Bryant appeals the Magistrate Judge's order denving her "motion for leave to file an amicus brief and to expand the scope of issues on appeal: in the habeas corpus proceeding of Carlo Johnson. An appeal taken from a pretrial order of a Magistrate Judge must be appealed to the District Court Judge. 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(A). Accordingly, the Clerk is directed to forward the notice of appeal to the District Court for docketing as an appeal to the District Court Judge. The appeal is dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Moreover, we note that several Courts of appeals have determined that the denial of a motion to participate as amicus curiae is not appealable. Boston & Providence Railroad Stockholders Development Group v. Smith, 333 F.2d 651 (2d Cir. 1964) (per curiam); Clark v. Sandusky, 205 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1953). See also S.E.C. v. Better Life Club of America, 1998 WL 389102, \*1 (D.C.Cir. 1998) (per curiam), filed. HPS-74

01/30/2001 Certified copy of order to Lower Court.

01/30/2001 RECORD, RETURNED.

# General Docket Third Circuit Court of Appeals

Court of Appeals Docket #: 01-1325 Docketed:

02/09/2001

**Termed:** 06/26/2001

Nature of Suit: 3530 Habeas Corpus

Johnson v. Dragovich, et al

Appeal From: U.S. District Court for the District

of Eastern Pennsylvania

## **Case Type Information:**

1) civil

2) private

3) Habeas Corpus-prisoner

## **Originating Court Information:**

District: 0313-2:00-cv-01097

District Judge: Clarence C Newcomer,

U.S. District Judge

Date Filed: 03/01/2000

Date Order/Judgment: Date NOA Filed:

01/18/2001 02/06/2001

02/09/2001 CIVIL CASE DOCKETED. Notice filed by Carlo Johnson.

02/09/2001 RECORD (State Court Record included), received. (District Court Record and State Court Record contained in 2 boxes).

02/12/2001 STAFF ATTORNEY LETTER SENT advising case will be submitted to a panel of this Court for a decision on the issuance of certificate of appealability.

02/14/2001 APPEARANCE from Attorney Thomas W. Dolgenos on behalf of Appellees Martin

Dragovich, DA Philadelphia and Atty Gen PA, filed.

- 02/15/2001 TRANSCRIPT PURCHASE ORDER (PART I), no proceedings in District Court.
- 02/26/2001 MOTION by Appellant Carlo Johnson for certificate of appealability, filed. Answer due 3/12/01. Certificate Service dated 2/26/01.
- 02/26/2001 MOTION by Appellant Carlo Johnson for certification of additional issues, filed.

  Answer due 3/12/01. Certificate of Service dated 2/26/01.
- 06/26/2001 ORDER (Sloviter, Barry and Ambro, Authoring Judge, Circuit Judges) denying request for a certificate of appealability because we find, for essentially the same reasons given by the District court in denying his petition, that the appellant has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. Section 2253(c)(2). The motion for certification of additional issues is denied because even if it were appropriate for this Court to address new claims on appeal, the motion is barred by the statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(d). United States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d 333 (3d Cir. 1999). filed. APS-176

06/26/2001 Certified copy of order to Lower Court.

06/26/2001 RECORD RETURNED. (Record and State Court Record Returned) (Record and State Court Record in 2 boxes)

# General Docket Third Circuit Court of Appeals

Court of Appeals Docket #: 07-2932 Docketed:

06/28/2007

In Re: Johnson Termed: 08/16/2007

Appeal From: U.S. District Court for the District

of Eastern Pennsylvania

## **Case Type Information:**

- 1) original proceeding
- 2) shc-2244b
- 3) DC Civil Case

## **Originating Court Information:**

District: 0313-2:

06/28/2007 Original Proceeding FOR LEAVE TO FILE second or successive petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(b). No-

tice filed by Carlo Johnson.

- 06/28/2007 NONCOMPLIANCE LETTER requesting Petitioner submit additional documents in support of Sec. 2244 Petition within 21 days.
- 07/17/2007 COMPLIANCE from Petitioner of documents in support of 2244 petition, RE-CEIVED.

07/17/2007 Compliance for 2244 petition received. Application is deemed filed.

07/26/2007 Submitted on application to file second/successive petition. Coram: Sloviter, Chagares and Greenberg, Circuit Judges.

08/16/2007 ORDER (Sloviter, Chagares and Greenberg, Authoring Judge, Circuit Judges) denying application for permission to file a (Habeas) second or successive Section 2254 petition. Johnson has failed to make a prima facie showing that: (1) the claim relies on a retroactively applicable "new rule" of constitutional law; or (2) "the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense." See 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(b)(2), filed. ALD-325

08/16/2007 Certified copy of order to Lower Court.

#### APPENDIX C

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
21400 United States Courthouse
601 Market Street
Philadelphia PA 19106-1790

www.ca3.uscourts.gov

June 28, 2007

Marcia M. Waldron Clerk

Telephone 267-299-4916

Mr. Carlo Johnson 874 Douglas Avenue Elkins Park, PA 19027

DA Philadelphia Office of District Attorney Three South Penn Square Philadelphia, PA 19107-3499

RE: Docket No. 07-2932 In Re: Johnson

We have today docketed a motion requesting permission to file a second or successive petition in the United States District Court filed by Carlo Johnson at No. 07-2932 (28 U.S.C. Section 2244(b) and/or 2255). This docket number must appear on all documents related to this case which are submitted to this Court. A copy of the motion is enclosed for opposing counsel.

Any response to the motion must be received in the Office of the Clerk within seven (7) days from the date of this letter. A response may be filed by facsimile provided that a signed original of the response is subsequently mailed to the Office of the Clerk. Third Circuit LAR 25.1.

Any motion authorizing the filing of a second or successive petition must be decided no later than 30 days after the filing of the motion. In light of the time period for disposition, absolutely no extensions of time shall be granted. If a response is received after the expiration of the response period, the Court may reach its decision without consideration of the untimely response.

It should be noted that the grant or denial of an authorization by the Court of Appeals shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari (28 U.S.C. Section 2244(b)(E) (as amended April 26, 1996)).

In the event the Court of Appeals authorizes the filing of a second or successive petition, petitioner should attach a copy of this Court's order granting such permission to any petition which is to be filed in the district court.

Very truly yours, MARCIA M. WALDRON Clerk

By: Anthony Infante
Case Manager

#### OFFICE OF THE CLERK

#### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
21400 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE
601 MARKET STREET
PHILADELPHIA 19106-1790
Website: http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov

June 28, 2007

MARCIA M. WALDRON CLERK

TELEPHONE 267-299-4916 215-597-2995

Mr. Carlo Johnson 874 Douglas Avenue Elkins Park, PA 19027

> In Re: Carlo Johnson C.A. No. 07-2932

Dear Mr. Johnson:

We are in receipt of your Motion under 28 U.S. §2244 for Order Authorizing District Court to Consider Second or Successive Application for Relief Under 28 U.S.C. §2255.

This application is incomplete, however. In addition to the documents you submitted, you must also file copies of the following documents:

1. the new habeas petition you propose to file; E.D. Pa. No. 00-cv-1097

2. the petition(s) you filed in your prior habeas action(s); E.D. Pa. No. 00-cv-1097

See Third Circuit LAR 22.5.

You must file an original and 4 copies of the documents listed above within 21 days of the date of this letter. You must serve a copy of these documents on the District Attorney of Philadelphia County, and you must file a certificate of service with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. Respondent may file a response within 7 days of the filing of your completed application. These deadlines supersede any other deadlines.

Please note that you must order copies of these documents from the District Court Clerk's Office if they are no longer in your possession. There is a charge of \$.50 per page for copy work, payable to the Clerk of the District Court.

Because the documents listed above were not included with your application and are necessary for its determination, your application is deemed lodged with the Court. No action will be taken regarding your application until copies of the above-listed documents are received by the Clerk. Your documents will be docketed as an amendment to your petition.

Failure to file these documents may result in the dismissal of your case.

Very truly yours, MARCIA M. WALDRON, Clerk

/s/ Anthony Infante

By: Anthony Infante Case Manager 267-299-4916

Enclosures

cc:

DA Philadelphia

July 26, 2007

## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

C.A. No. 07-2932

IN RE: CARLO JOHNSON,

Petitioner

Present: SLOVITER, CHAGARES AND GREENBERG, CIRCUIT JUDGES

Submitted is Petitioner's application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244 to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition

in the above-captioned case.

Respectfully,

Clerk

MMW/RL/awi

ORDER

The foregoing application for permission to file a second or successive § 2254 petition is denied. Johnson has failed to make a prima facie showing that: (1) the claim relies on a retroactively applicable "new rule" of constitutional law; or (2) "the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant

guilty of the underlying offense." See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).

By the Court,

/s/ Morton I. Greenberg

Circuit Judge

#### JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT

J.C. No. 07-18

IN RE: COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT OR DISABILITY

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 351

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(Filed: August 2, 2007)

Present: SCIRICA, Chief Judge.

This is a complaint filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 351 against a United States Magistrate Judge (Respondent). Complainant is a prisoner serving a state sentence for a conviction involving a homicide.

Respondent entered a Report and Recommendation in 2000 recommending that a habeas corpus

¹ At the time that it occurred, that homicide, which involved a dispute between teenagers from different neighborhoods, received a large amount of media coverage. The victim, who was apparently not involved in the dispute died after being hit by a baseball bat and kicked with steel-toed shoes.

petition filed by Complainant be denied. The District Judge approved and accepted that Recommendation and dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Third Circuit denied a certificate of appealability.<sup>2</sup>

The complaint is somewhat enigmatic. It appears to argue that the habeas corpus petition was not decided correctly and, therefore, was never docketed. This assertion is apparently based on Respondent's characterization of the crime for which Complainant was convicted. The complaint states:

A Writ of Habeas Corpus is one of the most protected writs under the law. [Respondent] ruled, "based on the record" it is clear the conviction is third degree murder.

According to the Pennsylvania State Police Central Repository and the Certified record of the [state] Court the criminal conspiracy was not *Third Degree Murder*. In fact the conspiracy in question was an (F2) Felony.

The Docket Number [assigned the habeas petition] does not exist. The Freedom of Information & Privacy staff made it very clear that there are no records in the [District Court].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> At this time Complainant has an application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) for leave to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition pending.

According to PACER [Respondent] not only misrepresented the court record, [Respondent] did not docket [the docket number assigned the petition].

\* \* \*

[Respondent could have never docketed [the docket number assigned to the petition] without a warrant, bill of indictment, or certified record.

T

The judicial misconduct statute provides a remedy if a federal judicial officer, "has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts." 28 U.S.C. § 351(a). A Chief Judge may dismiss a complaint brought under the statute if, after review, he finds that it is not cognizable under the statute, is directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling, or is legally frivolous or lacks sufficient evidence to raise an inference of misconduct. 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(i-iii).

Section 352(b)(1)(A)(ii) (formerly 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3)(A)(ii)), which provides for dismissal of complaints related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling, reflects Congress' concern that a misconduct complaint not be used as vehicle by which disappointed litigants may challenge judicial action or inaction occurring in the course of litigation which

is reviewable by appeal or mandamus.<sup>3</sup> The Senate Report on 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) states, "It is important to point out what subsection (c) does not mean; it is not designed to assist the disgruntled litigant who is unhappy with the result of a particular case." S. Rep. No. 362, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4315, 4322.

#### II.

Insofar as all of the allegations in the complaint ultimately turn on whether the Report and Recommendation made by the Respondent in the case were correct, the complaint must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii) as being directly related to judicial decisions and procedural rulings. The misconduct complaint procedures are not a means for an individual litigant to obtain corrective relief or to resolve errors in cases. Such relief is available only through the normal case-related procedures.

Referring to 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3)(A)(ii) (now 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii)), the Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit has stated:

There is ... a statutory directive for dismissal of complaints of judicial misconduct

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Effective November 2, 2002 the Judicial Improvements Act of 2002 replaced the former 28 U.S.C. § 372(c), which governed complaints of judicial misconduct or disability, with 28 U.S.C. § 351, et seq. Although certain additions and minor changes were made in regard to the complaint procedures, the substance of the former 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) remains intact.

which in substance are simply objections to substantive or procedural error. This principle is supported by compelling policy. To determine whether a judge's rulings were so legally indefensible as to mandate intervention would require the same type of legal analysis as is afforded on appeal.

In re: Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 685 F.2d 1226, 1227 (Ninth Circuit Judicial Council 1982).

The claims that a docket for the habeas corpus petition does not exist and that a habeas corpus petition could not be docketed without the state charging documents and a certified record must be dismissed as legally frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(iii).<sup>4</sup>

Accordingly the complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(i)(ii) and (iii).

/s/ Anthony J. Scirica Chief Judge

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Contrary to the assertion that the state court record was not certified to the District Court, that Court's docket reflects that the state record was received and forwarded to Respondent.

Since Respondent was not the official responsible for docketing the petition, the allegation that she failed to open a docket must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(i) as not cognizable under the statute since that statute only applies to judges.

## **EXHIBIT A**

## SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TITLE	DOCKET NUMBER AND DISPOSITION	DATE	LOWER COURT DOCKET NUMBER/ COUNTY
Castle Gas v. Equitrans	00286PGH97 Affirmed	12/23/97	GD93-10845 (Allegheny)
Caton v. Hardesty	02719PHL96 Vacated and Affirmed	12/05/97	92-FC-703 (Lehigh)
Chesley v.		12/23/97	NS950800 (Erie)
Cillo v. Castle		12/04/97	95-01974 (Lycoming)
Citicorp v. Ditizio		12/22/97	265 Dec. T., 1995 (Philadelphia)
Cochran v. Elsten		12/22/97	89-002481-16-2 (Bucks)
Cole v. Stanko <sup>4</sup>	01211PGH97 Affirmed	11/25/97	14721-1995 (Erie)
Coles v.		12/22/97	FD94-3556 (Allegheny)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Petition for reargument denied January 30, 1998

Com. v. Abbott	00474PHL97 Affirmed	12/17/97	95-05-1228½ (Philadelphia)
Com. v. Ackley	00839PHL97 Vacated and Remanded	12/31/97	96-32 (Sullivan)
Com. v. Afrasa		12/30/97	1719-89 (Delaware)
Com. v. Akbar	01561PHL97 Affirmed	12/31/97	A1521, 96 (Montgomery)
Com. v. Alberts	01181PGH96 Reversed, Vacated and Remanded	12/18/97	CC 9511301 (Allegheny)
Com. v. Alexander <sup>5</sup>		12/16/97	9412-442 5/7 (Philadelphia)
Com. v. Allen		12/19/97	B1521-96 (Montgomery)
Com. v. Amick		12/15/97	CC-26-96 (Adams)
Com. v. Arocho		12/04/97	96-10121 (Lebanon)
Com. v. Bachert	00228HBG97 Affirmed, Dismissed and Remanded	12/01/97	163, 193 & 194 CA 1996 (Tioga)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> A petition for reargument was filed and granted at No. 1425PHL96. The petition for reargument was granted on February 26, 1998. Therefore, this decision is only for the cases at: 1194, 1281, 1324, 1325 and 1470 PHL 96.

Com. v. Baez		12/04/97	96-10057 (Lebanon)
Com. v. Balas <sup>6</sup>	04228PHL96 Quashed	12/03/97	96-3533 (Bucks)
Com. v. Banner	00111PHL97 Affirmed	12/23/97	1290/1989 (Lehigh)
	* *	*	
Com. v. Crelin	00728HBG95 Affirmed and Vacated	12/17/97	94 CR 000481 (Bradford)
Com. v. Cressley	00284PGH97 Affirmed	12/24/97	160 & 161 of 1996 (Warren)
Com. v. Crook <sup>8</sup>		12/16/97	9412-442 2/7 (Philadelphia)
Com. v. Dangerfield		12/17/97	9011-0606 (Philadelphia)
Com. v. Daniels		12/12/97	9401-153 (Philadelphia)
Com. v. Davis	00351PHL97 Affirmed	12/30/97	9302-3028-1/1 (Philadelphia)
Com. v. Deeghan	00050HBG97 Affirmed	12/12/97	255-95 (Clinton)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Petition for reargument denied February 13, 1998

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> A petition for reargument was filed and granted at No. 1425PHL96. The petition for reargument was granted on February 26, 1998. Therefore, this decision is only for the cases at: 1194, 1281, 1324, 1325 and 1470 PHL 96.

Com. v. Dennis		12/17/97	9602-1045, 9602-1064 (Philadelphia)
Com. v. Derrick		12/17/97	90-11, 233 (Lycoming)
Com. v. Diangelo	00050HBG97 Affirmed	12/16/97	1471 & 1757 of 1990 (Erie)
Com. v. Dickson	00303GH97 Affirmed	12/31/97	395 of 1996 (Greene)
Com. v. Dipreta		12/31/97	794 of 1995 (Mercer)
Com. v. Distefano <sup>9</sup>	00955PHL97 Affirmed	11/26/97	96-CR-737 (Lackawanna)
Com. v. Dodson	01324PGH96 Affirmed	12/31/97	95 CR 884 (Blair)
Com. v. Dohanics	00406PGH97 Reversed and Vacated	12/22/97	CL 2378 of 1996 (Allegheny)
Com. v. Dooley	01890PHL97 Affirmed	12/15/97	22-SA/1997 (Lehigh)
Com. v. Dorsey	00284HBG97 Vacated and Remanded	12/05/97	1582 CD 1994 (Dauphin)
Com. v. Dott	00618PGH97 Affirmed	12/17/97	CL97-2571 (Allegheny)

<sup>9 [</sup>Illegible]

Com. v. Drayton	03452PHL96 Quashed	12/10/97	9107-4421- 4423 (Philadelphia)
Com. v. Dudley	03351PHL96 Affirmed	12/17/97	C.P. 8902-3543 (Philadelphia)
Com. v. Duralia <sup>10</sup>	00160PGH97 Affirmed	12/02/97	C.A. 1996-373 (Crawford)
Com. v. Dyne	00638PGH97 Affirmed	12/24/97	02057 of 1996 (Erie)
	* *	神	
Com. v. Jasterzenski	01539PHL97 Reversed, Vacated and Remanded	12/31/97	2365 of 195 (Luzerne)
Com. v. Johnson, Karlton	00103HBG97 Vacated and Remanded	12/24/97	96-10, 255 and 96-11, 084 (Lycoming)
Com. v. Johnson, Kevin	02607PHL96 Affirmed	12/15/97	93-11-2761 (Philadelphia)
Com. v. Johnson, J	00158HBG97 Vacated and Remanded	12/01/97	3261 CA 1989 (York)
Com. v. Jones	03601PHL96 Affirmed	12/04/97	0007-3/3 Jan. T., 1995 (Philadelphia)

<sup>10 [</sup>Illegible]

Com. v. Jordan		12/30/97	1261 of 1991 (Fayette)
Com. v. Joynes	00014PHL97 Affirmed	12/18/97	3735 1/1 March T., 1992 (Philadelphia)
Com. v. Jumper	00893HBG96 Affirmed	12/09/97	95-1594 (Cumberland)
Com. v. Kelly	03813PHL96 Affirmed	12/31/97	9307-3522 1/1 (Philadelphia)
Com. v. Kelsay		12/30/97	1290-95, 1291-95, 1309-95 (Chester)
Com. v. Kennedy		12/31/97	9602-0376 1/1 (Philadelphia)
Com. v. Khathavong <sup>15</sup>	01470PHL96 Affirmed	12/16/97	94-12-442 1/7 802-769 (Philadelphia)
Com. v. King		12/09/97	1861/96 (Berks)
Com. v. Kniskern		12/22/97	96-CR-2778 (Susquehanna)
Com. v. Kott, D	00693PGH97 Affirmed	12/31/97	1246-1996 (Cambria)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> A petition for reargument was filed and granted at No. 1425PHL96. The petition for reargument was granted on February 26, 1998. Therefore, this decision is only for the cases at: 1194, 1281, 1324, 1325 and 1470 PHL 96.

Com. v.	00694PGH97	12/31/97	1245-1996
Kott, R	Vacated		(Cambria)
Com. v. Krostag		12/16/97	606 of 1993 (Luzerne)
Com. v.	00273HBG97	12/05/97	1996-1947
Kustaborder	Vacated		(Centre)
Com. v. Lacorte		12/09/97	238 of 1997 (Monroe)
Com. v.	00069PGH97	12/30/97	63 of 1996
Landry	Affirmed		(Fayette)
Com. v.	00948HBG96	12/15/97	96-0724
Lane	Affirmed		(Cumberland)
	**	帐	
Com. v.	00326HBG97	12/05/97	1036 of 1996
Moss	Affirmed		(Franklin)
Com. v.	00480PHL97	12/12/97	9510-1161-1/1
Mullins	Affirmed		(Philadelphia)
Com. v. Murphy	01798PHL96 Affirmed and Remanded	12/09/97	1473 Dec. T., 1994 (Philadelphia)
Com. v. Nathan		12/18/97	9504-0591 (Philadelphia)
Com. v.	01425PHL97	12/10/97	1516-1996
Neff	Affirmed		(Lancaster)
Com. v.	00043PGH97	12/03/97	00665 of 1991
Nemeth	Affirmed		(Erie)
Com. v. Noble		12/24/97	318 A & B of 1992 (Erie)

Com. v. Null	00341HBG97 Affirmed	12/05/97	345 CA 1986 (York)
Com. v. Oakes	OUZUUI GIIU!	12/18/97	2630 of 1991 (Erie)
Com. v. O'Dell	00423PGH97 Affirmed	12/31/97	270 of 1995 (Elk)
Com. v. Oliver	00741PGH97 Vacated and Remanded	12/19/97	CC 9605133 (Allegheny)
Com. v. Olson	02238PGH96 Affirmed, Vacated and Remanded	12/26/97	96-580-CRA (Clearfield)
Com. v. Onadein	01896PHL97 Affirmed	12/08/97	343-95 (Chester)
Com. v. Page		12/11/97	3086 May T., 1988 (Philadelphia)
Com. v. Patterson	00122PGH97 Retained	12/16/97	1142-1143 of 1996 (Erie)
Com. v. Peterson		12/10/97	8711-2486-1/1 (Philadelphia)
Com. v. Pew	00459HBG97 Affirmed	12/31/97	2271, 2271(A), 2322 CD 1983 (Dauphin)

Com. v. Piaquadio <sup>16</sup>	00678PGH97 Affirmed	12/02/97	17 of 1997 (Potter)
Com. v. Pinckney		12/31/97	9508-0216 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> (Philadelphia)
Com. v. Pinero <sup>17</sup>		12/16/97	9412-442 3/7 (Philadelphia)
Com. v. Plahs		12/03/97	1651 C 1995 (Westmore- land)
Com. v. Platt <sup>18</sup>		11/17/97	2510-95 (Delaware)
Com. v. Powell	00110PHL97 Affirmed	12/11/97	SA 40172-96 (Delaware)
Com. v. Prinkey		12/03/97	139-1/2 of 1996 (Fayette)
Com. v. Rabiega		12/31/97	90 CR 171 (Lackawanna)
Com. v. Radle		12/04/97	95-928 (Cumberland)
Com. v. Randell	03621PHL96 Affirmed	12/01/97	9512-0888 1/1 (Philadelphia)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Petition for reargument denied February 13, 1998

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> A petition for reargument was filed and granted at No. 1425PHL96. The petition for reargument was granted on February 26, 1998. Therefore, this decision is only for the cases at: 1194, 1281, 1324, 1325 and 1470 PHL 96.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Petition for reargument denied January 26, 1998

Com. v. Raynes		12/08/97	1984 CR 15, 150, 612, 657 (Blair)
Com. v. Reaves	02755PHL96 Affirmed	12/29/97	0338 Nov. T., 1995 (Philadelphia)
Com. v. Redd		12/11/97	2624 of 1995 (Erie)
Com. v. Rego		12/19/97	9312-2502- 2504 (Philadelphia)
Com. v. Reidenbach		12/05/97	96-0071 (Cumberland)
Com. v. Rice	00835PGH97 Quashed	12/30/97	805 & 937 of 1996 (Erie)
Com. v. Rienzi <sup>19</sup>	01324PHL96 Affirmed	12/16/97	9412-442 (Philadelphia)
Com. v. Rivera		12/31/97	95-03-0439-1/1 (Philadelphia)
Com. v. Robinson		12/09/97	9012-0246 (Philadelphia)
Com. v. Rockwell, Rick		12/17/97	75 of 1995 (McKean)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> A petition for reargument was filed and granted at No. 1425PHL96. The petition for reargument was granted on February 26, 1998. Therefore, this decision is only for the cases at: 1194, 1281, 1324, 1325 and 1470 PHL 96.

Com. v. Rockwell, Roy		12/17/97	74 of 1995 (McKean)
Com. v. Rodriguez		12/31/97	89-07-1683 & 1687 (Philadelphia)
Com. v. Rodriquez, E. <sup>20</sup>	Affirmed	12/09/97	M.C. 9504- 1946, M.R. 96-001714 (Philadelphia)
Com. v. Rodriquez, O	01231PHL96 Affirmed	12/15/97	3980-87 (Montgomery)
Com. v. Rosario		12/12/97	624-1991 (Lancaster)
Com. v. Rues	.01290PHL97 Affirmed	12/08/97	2139-1996, 2140-1996 (Northampton)
Com. v. Ruiz	.02108PHL96 Retained	12/1 '97	9603-0908 (Philadelphia)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Petition for reargument denied February 10, 1998

#### EXHIBIT B

Commonwealth v. : IN THE SUPERIOR Crook, T. : COURT OF

Commonwealth v. : PENNSYLVANIA

Pinero, N

Commonwealth v. : PHILADELPHIA 1996 – Rienzi, A. : 1994, 1281, 1324, 1325,

Commonwealth v. : 1425 & 1470

Alexander, D.

Commonwealth v. :
Johnson, C. :

Commonwealth v. :

Khathavong, B.

BEFORE: CAVANAUGH, SCHILLER, AND MONTEMURO\*, J.J.

### JUDGMENT

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of PHILA-DELPHIA County be, and the same is hereby AFFIRMED AS TO PHILADELPHIA, 1996 – 1994, 1281, 1324, 1325 and 1470. VACATED AND REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS; JURISDICTION RELINQUISHED AS TO PHILADELPHIA, 1996 – 1425.

#### BY THE COURT:

/s/ [Illegible] PROTHONOTARY

Date: DECEMBER 16, 1997

Commonwealth v. McGill, 545 Pa. 180, 188, 680 A.2d 1131, 1135 (1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1087 (1997). Accord Commonwealth v. Connolly, 456 Pa. Super. 133, 689 A.2d 950 (1997). Therefore, this claim of ineffectiveness must also fail.

Finally, concerning the argument that his counsel did not present a defense, while it is true that Rienzi's trial counsel did not call any witnesses on his client's behalf, he did present argument to the jury, did cross-examine Commonwealth witnesses, and did question witnesses who were called by the other appellants. In fact, counsel's closing argument focused on the conflict in the testimony of several witnesses called either by the Commonwealth or the other defendants. Certainly, Rienzi's counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to call as a witness an individual who had already been called by another defendant, when Rienzi's counsel undertook his own examination of the witness. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Spencer, 432 Pa. Super. 631, 639 A.2d 820 (1994) (counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to call witnesses whose testimony is merely cumulative of other witnesses). Moreover, appellant has not provided the name of any fact witness who would have been

helpful to his case who was not called by any of the defendants at trial. Once again, without specifically alleging how counsel was ineffective, see Commonwealth v. Silo, supra, appellant has not stated a basis for relief.

In his appeal, appellant Johnson argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for conspiracy.<sup>5</sup> His argument is based on his contention that he was convicted of conspiracy to commit third degree murder.<sup>6</sup> However, our review of the record

Commonwealth v. Pearson, 454 Pa. Super. 313, 685 A.2d 551 (1996) (en banc)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> In his brief, appellant Johnson also argues that there was not sufficient evidence to convict him of murder as an accomplice. This argument is misplaced because Johnson was not convicted of such a crime. It is true that "[t]he law in Pennsylvania is settled that each conspirator is criminally responsible for the actions of his co-conspirator, provided that the actions are accomplished in furtherance of a common design." Commonwealth v. Baskerville, 452 Pa. Super. 82, 93, 681 A.2d 195, 201 (1996), alloc. denied, \_\_\_\_ Pa. \_\_\_\_, 689 A.2d 230 (1997). Thus, while Johnson could have been convicted of murder based on the actions of his co-conspirators, he was acquitted of such a charge. Therefore, his argument concerning accomplice liability, based on his status as a co-conspirator, is irrelevant to his conviction.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> This confusion on the part of appellant's counsel is somewhat understandable in light of comments made by the trial judge during sentencing, and by the position taken by the Commonwealth on this appeal. Therefore, in the interest of justice, we do not consider appellant's misstated argument as a waiver of a future sufficiency argument directed to the judgment of sentence entered on remand. However, depending on which subsection(s) of the aggravated assault statute is (are) found to have been violated, we fail to see how a sufficiency challenge (Continued on following page)

reveals that Johnson was never charged with conspiracy to commit murder. The criminal information filed by the Commonwealth against Johnson stated only that Johnson agreed with others to commit a crime, and defined the criminal objective as "to beat Eddie Polec." Nowhere in the information filed against Johnson was there an allegation regarding a conspiracy to kill or murder Polec. As the information did not allege the crime of conspiracy to commit murder, Johnson could not have been convicted of such a crime. "The law is clear that a defendant cannot be convicted of an offense which is not the accusation made against him." Commonwealth v. Speller, 311 Pa. Super. 569, 579, 458 A.2d 198, 203 (1983); Pa.R.Crim.P. 225(d) ("In all court cases tried

would be successful. Based on our review of the record, the evidence presented at trial clearly supports a verdict that Johnson was guilty of conspiracy to violate one or more of the subsections of the statute.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Conspiracy does not exist in a vacuum; it requires an agreement to commit a **crime**, and is graded according to the severity of the intended crime. 18 Pa.C.S. § 905(a).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> We note that the conspiracy charge filed against Johnson involving Richard Stuber defined that criminal objective as "to beat Richard Stuber." We reject the contention implicit in the Commonwealth's argument that the conspiracy charge as to Polec had to be conspiracy to commit murder because Polec died, while the conspiracy charge as to Stuber had to be conspiracy to commit aggravated assault because Stuber survived.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> A separate information filed against Johnson did charge him with murder as to Polec, as well as aggravated assault and simple assault against Richard Stuber. At trial, he was acquitted of these additional crimes.

on an information, the issues at trial shall be defined by such information").

Therefore, we must remand this case to the trial court for a determination of Johnson's conviction, and resentencing following that determination. Accordingly, we are compelled to vacate Johnson's judgment of sentence as entered and remand his case to the trial court.

#### CONCLUSION:

The trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss a juror for cause. The record does not support a conclusion that the Commonwealth used its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense motions for mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct arising out of either the opening statement or closing argument. The trial court did not err

of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, it must then determine which subsection of aggravated assault was involved due to the variance in the offense gravity scores for the different subsections of aggravated assault. Of course, the court must also state the reasons for its sentence, particularly if that sentence is within the aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines or outside the guidelines altogether. In addition, as the trial court recognized, some of the appellants may be subject to the deadly weapon enhancement contained in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721, 204 Pa. Code § 303.4(a). But see Commonwealth v. Greene, \_\_\_ Pa. Super. \_\_\_, \_\_\_ A.2d \_\_\_ (September 30, 1997) (deadly weapon enhancement not applicable to unarmed accomplice).

in instructing the jury on the elements of conspiracy, nor did the court show bias and prejudice in favor of the Commonwealth. Trial counsel for appellant Rienzi was not ineffective as counsel did present a defense. However, as it is unclear of what crime appellant Johnson was convicted, we cannot evaluate his sufficiency argument, and instead are compelled to vacate his sentence and remand his case to the trial court for a final determination of that matter and for resentencing.

The judgment of sentence of appellant Crook [1194 Philadelphia 1996] is affirmed.

The judgment of sentence of appellant Pinero [1281 Philadelphia 1996] is affirmed.

The judgment of sentence of appellant Rienzi [1324 Philadelphia 1996] is affirmed.

The judgment of sentence of appellant Alexander [1325 Philadelphia 1996] is affirmed.

The judgment of sentence of appellant Khathavong [1470 Philadelphia 1996] is affirmed.

The judgment of sentence of appellant Johnson [1425 Philadelphia 1996] is vacated, and the case remanded for proceedings consistent with this Memorandum.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

#### EXHIBIT C

In the Common Pleas Court of the County of Philadelphia

CRIMINAL SECTION

COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA
COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA ss 9412 0442 7/7

THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF PHILADELPHIA
BY THIS INFORMATION CHARGES THAT ON OR
ABOUT 11/11/94 IN PHILADELPHIA,
CARLO JOHNSON

WITH THE INTENT OF PROMOTING OR FACILITATING THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME

- 1. AGREED WITH ANOTHER PERSON OR PERSONS THAT THEY OR ONE OR MORE OF THEM WOULD ENGAGE IN CONDUCT WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE SUCH CRIME OR AN ATTEMPT OR SOLICITATION TO COMMIT SUCH CRIME, AND COMMITTED, OR SUCH OTHER PERSON OR PERSONS COMMITTED, AN OVERT ACT IN PURSUANCE OF SUCH AGREEMENT
- 2. AGREED TO AID SUCH OTHER PERSON OR PERSONS IN THE PLANNING OR COMMISSION OR SUCH CRIME OR IN AN ATTEMPT OR SOLICITATION TO COMMIT SUCH CRIME AND COMMITTED, OR SUCH OTHER PERSON OR PERSONS COMMITTED, AN OVERT ACT IN PURSUANCE OF SUCH AGREEMENT

CO-CONSPIRATORS - A. RIENZI, K. CONVEY, T. CROOK, K. BOU, N. PINERO, D. ALEXANDER

CRIMINAL OBJECTIVE - TO BEAT EDWARD POLEC

OVERT ACT - BEAT EDWARD POLEC

NO. OF COUNTS - 1

18 PA.C.S. 903(A).

All of which is against the Act of Assembly and the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

> ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY

> > ARLENE FISK

DISTRICT ATTORNEY 12/23/94

LYNNE ABRAHAM

	RECEIPT		66-40339		
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE		DATE (Use Numerals)			
RECEIVED FROM			MONTH 3	DAY 13	YEAR 6
ADDRESS	(City)	(State)	(Zip Code)		
AMOUNT \$ 12.50		FOR-GIVE PA	RTICULARS		
☐ License ☐ Permit ☐ Invoice ☐ Plan	NUMBER	CERTIFICATI	ON		
FUND	INDEX COL	)E	SOURC	E COD	E
NOTE A SEPARATE RECEIPT IS FOR EACH INDEX CODE.					
DEPARTMENT	QS	CERTIFICATI	ONS 24 PI	HILA 00	1-00012
CONTACT PERSON	TJC	22 0 13-N	IAR-06 12:1	1 66	6040339
TELEPHONE NUMBER		12.50 CAS	SH IN		12.50
PAYOR THIS I	S NOT A LICENS		THANK YOU	J	

83-F-3 (Rev. 9/04)

# In the Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia

### ☐ MUNICIPAL COURT

☐ FAMILY COURT DIVISION

☑ TRIAL DIVISION, CRIMINAL SECTION

COMMONWEALTH

<u>December</u> Term, <u>1994</u> No. 0442 7/7

US.

Carlo Johnson Sur Charge

I CERTIFY the foregoing to be a true and correct copy of the whole Record, in the case above stated, as full, entire and complete as the same now remains of Record in this office.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court this 13 day of March A.D., 2006.

[SEAL]

/s/ [Illegible] E. Gaillard

Clerk of Courts

DISM.
BILL NO.
DATE 12/23/94
DATE OF ARRAIGN. 12/29/94
POL. SURG. RM. 625
CHARGE CODES & CHARGES  CC25020 - MURDER 1-10-96 Plea -  2502 H Not Guilty /s/ DC
PRE-TRIAL/TRIAL
WAIVER/JURY
DATE
ROOM
COURT STENO
COURT CLERK
JUDGE
ADA
COUNSEL
PLEA <u>12/29/94 Carlo Johnson HAS BEEN AR-RAIGNED UNDER [ILLEGIBLE] CRIMINAL CODE SECTION 303-306</u>
BY THE COURT:
/s/ [Illegible]

### /s/ Stokes E. Mott, J. DEFENSE ATTORNEY Defendant's presentence waived DEFENDANT R659 Hon. Carolyn E. Temin 1-30-95 ADA: Joseph Casey Atty: Stokes Mott Steno: Dale Varallo Clk: [Illegible] Bail Motion Hearing Testimony taken from Carl Johnson, father; Reverend Patterson; Evelyn Mosley, Memo of law and pleading filed. Bail Motion is held under advisement C 2-3-95 RM 625 for Motion to Quash By the Court. /s/ [Illegible] VERDICT Hon. C. E. Temin 2/15/95 Rm 625. Motion to Quash is Denied. Bail is set in the amount of \$350,000.00. Three hundred and fifty thousand dollars, see attached conditions for bail C-3/27/95 Rm 625 time ruled [illegible] By the Court /s/ [Illegible] DATE Judge **SENTENCE** 1/2/96 Motion to suppress autopsy photos denied in part, granted in part

DATE 1/3/96

ROOM 304

COURT STENO E	Kevin Flanagan
COURT CLERK C	Cydney Rhodes
JUDGE Jane Gree	enspan
ADA Joseph Cases	y
COUNSEL Oscar	Gaskins, Esq.
	and (1/5/96) completed 1/10/96 pled
	Motion for judgment of acquittal
denied. 1/31/96, 11:30	0 a.m. Jury retired to deliberate.
2/05/96 - Verdict -	Not Guilty by the Jury. Jurors
polled 4:09 PM. Ver	dict recorded 4:11 PM.
	By the Court
	/s/ Greenspan J

THIS CASE INVOLVES NOS. 2 to 8
CHARGE CODES & CHARGES
CC27020 – AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
2702 F1 1-10-96 Plea -
Not Guilty
PRE-TRIAL/TRIAL
WAIVER/JURY Selection began and (1/5/96) completed
DATE <u>1/3/96</u>
ROOM 304
COURT STENO K. Flanagan
COURT CLERK <u>C. Rhodes</u>
JUDGE J. Greenspan
ADA J. Casey
COUNSEL O. Gaskins Esq.
PLEA 1/10/96 Plea - not guilty. 1/24/96 Motion for judgment of acquittal denied - 1/31/96, 11:30 a.m. Jury returned to deliberate.
Hon. Temin 1-30-95 Rm 659
ADA: J. Casey
Atty: Mott
Steno: D. Varallo
Clk: [Illegible]
Bail Motion Hearing Testimony taken from C. John-
son father; Rev. Patterson and Evelyn Mosley, Memo
of Law/pleadings filed. Bail Motion is held under
advisement C 2-3-95 RM 625 for Motion to Quash
By the Court
/s/ [Illegible]

VERDICT Not Guilty by 1	the Jury 02/05/96
DATE	
By the Court	2/15/95 Rm 625
/s/ Greenspan, J.	Motion to Quash Denied
	By the Court
	/s/ [Illegible]
_	Judge
SENTENCE	
DATE	
ROOM	
COURT STENO	
COURT CLERK	
JUDGE	
ADA	
COUNSEL	

THIS CASE INVOLVES NOS. 3 to 8
CHARGE CODES & CHARGES
CC09070 – POSSESSING INSTRUMENTS OF
CRIME 0907 M1
PRE-TRIAL/TRIAL
WAIVER/JURY
DATE
ROOM
COURT STENO
COURT CLERK
JUDGE
ADA
COUNSEL
PLEA
Hon. C. Temin 1-30-95
Bail Motion Hearing Testimony is taken from father.
Rev. Patterson, E. Mosley; Memo of Law filed. Bail
Motion is held under advisement C 2-3-95 Rm 625 for
Motion to Quash
By the Court
/s/ [Illegible]
VERDICT
<b>DATE</b> 2/15/95

App. 71

Motion to Quash filed under advisement C-3-27-95
Rm 625
By the Court
/s/ [Illegible]
Judge
SENTENCE
DATE March 19, 1996
ROOM 304
COURT STENO Kevin Flanagan
COURT CLERK [Illegible] Hamlin
JUDGE Jane Greenspan
ADA Joseph Casey
COUNSEL Oscar Gaskins, esquire
AND NOW <u>3/19</u> 1996 the District Attorney with leave of Court enters A Nolle pro [illegible] on the within bill of indictment
Approved /s/ J. Casey Asst. District Attorney
/s/ Greenspan Judge

THIS CASE INVOLVES NOS. 4 to 8
CHARGE CODES & CHARGES CC09070 - POSSESSING INSTRUMENTS OF
CRIME 0907 M1
PRE-TRIAL/TRIAL
WAIVER/JURY
DATE
ROOM
COURT STENO
COURT CLERK
JUDGE
ADA
COUNSEL
PLEA
Hon. Temin 1-30-95
Bail Motion Hearing Testimony taken/Memo of Law -
pleadings filed. Bail Motion is held under advisement
C 2-3-95 Rm 625 for Motion to Quash  By the Court
/s/ [Illegible]
VERDICT
<b>DATE</b> 2/15/95

App. 73

Motion to Quash filed under advisement C-3-27-95
Rm 625
By the Court
/s/ [Illegible]
Judge
SENTENCE
DATE March 19, 1996
ROOM 304
COURT STENO Kevin Flanagan
COURT CLERK [Illegible] Hamlin
JUDGE Jane Greenspan
ADA Joseph Casey
COUNSEL Oscar Gaskins, esquire
AND NOW 3/19 1996 the District Attorney with leave of Court enters A Nolle pro [illegible] on the within bill of indictment
Approved /s/ J. Casey
Asst. District Attorney
/s/ Greenspan Judge

THIS CASE INVOLVES NOS. 5 to 8	
CHARGE CODES & CHARGES  CC27010 – SIMPLE ASSAULT  2701 M2	
PRE-TRIAL/TRIAL	
WAIVER/JURY	
DATE	
ROOM	
COURT STENO	
COURT CLERK	
JUDGE	
ADA	
COUNSEL	
PLEA	
Hon. Temin 1-30-95  Bail Hearing Motion Testimony taken a Memo of L pleadings filed. Bail Motion is held under advisem C 2-3-95 Rm 625 for Motion to Quash  By the Court /s/ [Illegible]	nent
VERDICT	
DATE 2/15/95	
Motion to Quash Denied	
By the Court /s/ [Illegible]	
Judge	

SENTENCE
DATE March 19, 1996
ROOM 304
COURT STENO Kevin Flanagan
COURT CLERK [Illegible] Hamlin
JUDGE Jane Greenspan
ADA Joseph Casey
COUNSEL Oscar Gaskins, esquire
AND NOW <u>3/19</u> 1996 the District Attorney with leave of Court enters A Nolle pro [illegible] on the within bill of indictment
Approved /s/ J. Casey Asst. District Attorney

/s/ Greenspan Judge

THIS CASE INVOLVES NOS. 6 to 8
CHARGE CODES & CHARGES  CC27050 - RECKLESSLY ENDANGERING
ANOTHER PERSON 1-10-96 Plea.
2705 M2 Not Guilty
PRE-TRIAL/TRIAL
WAIVER/JURY Selection began and (1/5/96) completed.
DATE <u>1/3/96</u>
ROOM 304
COURT STENO K. Flanagan
COURT CLERK <u>C. Rhôdes</u>
JUDGE <u>J. Greenspan</u>
ADA J. Casey
COUNSEL O. Gaskins
PLEA 1/10/96 Plea – not guilty. 1/24/96 Motion for judgment of acquittal denied. 1/31/96, 11:30 a.m. Jury retired to deliberate.
Hon. C. E. Temin 1-30-95  Bail Motion Hearing Testimony taken and Memo of Law filed. Bail Motion is held under advisement C 2-3-95 for motion to Quash.  By the Court  /s/ [Illegible]
VERDICT Not Guilty by the Jury 02/05/96
DATE 2/15/95

By the Court	Motion to Quash Denied		
/s/ Greenspan, J.			
	Judge		
SENTENCE			
DATE			
ROOM			
COURT STENO			
COURT CLERK			
JUDGE			
ADA			
COUNSEL			

090		F2	PIRACY 1-10-96 Plea – Not Guilty
PRE-TRIAL/TR			
WAIVER/JURY pleted.	Sele	ection bega	in and (1/5/96) com-
DATE <u>1/3/96</u>			and an arrangement of the second of the seco
ROOM 304			
COURT STENO	K. 1	Flanagan	
COURT CLERK	<u>C. 1</u>	Rhodes	
JUDGE J. Gree	nspa	n	
ADA J. Casey			
COUNSEL O. C	aski	ns	
	ittal		y. 1/24/96 Motion for 31/96, 11:30 a.m. Jury
Hon. C. E. Temin ADA: J. Casey Atty: S. Mott Steno: D. Varal Clk: [Illegible]			
	iring	Testimon	y Is heard and held
under advisemen	t. C 2		
			Court, legible

By the Court,	2/15/95	
	Motion to Quash	
	1 / [7]7 - 7 7 7 7	
_	Judge	
SENTENCE		
DATE		
ROOM		
COURT STENO		
COURT CLERK		
JUDGE		
ADA		
COUNSEL		

CHARGE CODES & CHARGES
CC09030 – CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY 1-10-96 Plea – 0903 F2 Not Guilty
PRE-TRIAL/TRIAL
WAIVER/JURY Motion to suppress autopsy photos denied in part, granted in part.
DATE <u>1/2/96</u>
ROOM 304
COURT STENO Kevin Flanagan
COURT CLERK Cydney Rhodes
JUDGE Jane Greenspan
ADA Joseph Casey
COUNSEL Oscar Gaskins, Esq. R654
PLEA 1/3/96 Jury selection began and (1/5/96) completed completed.  1/10/96 Plea – not guilty. 1/24/96 motion for judgment of acquittal denied. 1/31/96, 11:30 a.m. Jury retired to
deliberate
2/05/96 Guilty by the Jury. Sentencing is deferred pending
receipt of a Presentence Investigation and a Menta
Health Evaluation. Bail increased from \$300,000.00 to \$500,000.00. C 3/19/96 R 200
By the Court
/s/ [Illegible]

COMMONWEAL VS.	TH		LEMENT TO: CTMENT NO.	
NAME, [ILLEGIBLE] ADDRESS, ZIP CODE		YEAR, TERM & NO.  94 December		
Carlo Johnson		THIS CASE INVOLVES NOS. 0442 7/7 TO # 8		
STAT	US OF	DEFEND	ANT	
	PROC	EEDING		
DATE 3/19/96	TYPE Senten	cing	COURTROOM 304	
COURT CLERK [Illegible] Hamlin		COURT STENO.  Kevin Flaniagan		
ADA Joseph Carey	ırey		DEF. COUNSEL Oscar Gaskins	
CONT. CODE	CONT. T	O RM.	ON (Date)	
B.W. ISSUED  B.W. WITHDRAY  SAME BAIL	WN	BAIL S NEW F	SUED OUT	
	PROC	EEDING		
DATE	TYPE		COURTROOM	
COURT CLERK		COURT STE	NO.	
ADA		DEF. COUNSEL		

App. 83

CONT. CODE	CONT. TO RM.	on (Date)	
B.W. ISSUED B.W. WITHDRA		AIL SUED OUT	
	PROCEEDING		
DATE	ТҮРЕ	COURTROOM	
COURT CLERK	COURT	STENO.	
ADA	DEF. CO	DEF. COUNSEL	
CONT. CODE	CONT. TO RM.	ON (Date)	
B.W. ISSUED  B.W. WITHDRA  SAME BAIL		AIL SUED OUT	

#### DOCKET IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER

(List Charge No. and follow with sentence – signed & dated by Judge)

Hon. Jane Greenspan Criminal Conspiracy

Not less than five (5) years nor more than ten (10) years in the State Correctional Institution. Credit time served. Plus \$15,000.00 fine and \$191. mandatory funds.

By the Court /s/ Greenspan, J.

10/23/98

JUDGMENT OF SENTENCE AFFIRMED BY THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

6/25/99

PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT DENIED

Deft at Mahoney C4-8736

8/11/99

Record Ret. To. CCP

# [ILLEGIBLE] PHILADELPHIA COUNTY

**BOOKING # 00000** 

12/02/94

FELONY P/H

DC # 94-07-032818 MC# 94113224

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

CARLO JOHNSON VS. AKA

I, THE UNDERSIGNED, DO HEREBY STATE UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION:

- (1) MY NAME IS: D. LLOYD DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S REPRESENTATIVE
- (2) I ACCUSE CARLO JOHNSON WHO LIVES AT XXX XXX XXX, XXX XXX XXX, WITH VIO-LATING THE PENAL LAWS OF PENN-SYLVANIA ON OR ABOUT FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1994 IN THE COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA.
- (3) THE ACTS COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED WERE:

AT/NEAR 7800 BLK OXFORD AVE, IN CONCERT WITH OTHERS, THE DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY, INTENTIONALLY OR RECKLESSLY CAUSED OR ATTEMPTED TO CAUSE SERIOUS BODILY INJURY TO THE COMPLAINANT, RICHARD STUBER, BY KICKING AND PUNCHING HIM, AND STRIKING HIM ABOUT THE HEAD WITH A BOTTLE, CAUSING INJURIES INCLUDING A FRACTURED

NOSE AND A LACERATION, REQUIRING MEDI-CAL TREATMENT, AND DEFT UNLAWFULLY POSSESSED TWO BATS

IN VIOLATION OF PA. PENAL LAWS, SECTION(S) AND TITLE(S):

2701-M2 SIM ASSLT 2702-F1 AGG ASSLT 2705-M2 REAP 2702-F2 AGG ASSLT 0907-M1 PIC 0903-F2 CONSP

12/9/94 - Murder, PEC, Conspiracy

ALL OF WHICH IS AGAINST THE PEACE AND DIGNITY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PA.

- (4) I ASK THAT A WARRANT OF ARREST OR A SUMMONS BE ISSUED AND THAT THE ACCUSED BE REQUIRED TO ANSWER THE CHARGES I HAVE MADE. THIS COMPLAINT HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY CYNTHIA MARTELLI A.D.A.
- (5) I SWEAR TO OR AFFIRM THAT WITHIN COMPLAINT UPON MY KNOWLEDGE, INFORMATION AND BELIEF, AND SIGN IT ON 12/3/94 BEFORE PHILA. MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE/BAIL COMMISSIONER

/s/ [Illegible]
SIGNATURE OF AFFIANT

ON 12/3/94 THE ABOVE NAMED AFFIANT SWORE OR AFFIRMED THAT THE FACTS SET FORTH IN THE COMPLAINT WERE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF HIS/HER KNOWLEDGE, INFORMATION AND BELIEF, AND SIGNED IT IN MY PRESENCE. I BELIEVE THE WITHIN AFFIANT TO BE A RESPONSIBLE PERSON THAT THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF PROCESS.

/s/ Rufus [Illegible]
ISSUING AUTHORITY SEAL

WAIVER: ON \_\_\_/\_\_\_, I APPEARED BEFORE JUDGE/BAIL COMMISSIONER WHO READ THE ABOVE COMPLAINT TO ME AND EXPLAINED ITS CONTENTS, AND I HEREBY WAIVED PRE-LIMINARY HEARING AND CONSENT TO BE BOUND OVER TO COURT.

DEFENDANT

**DEFENSE ATTORNEY** 

#### EXHIBIT D

COMMONWEALTH : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA : PENNSYLVANIA

CARLO JOHNSON, : No. 1425 Appellant : Philadelphia 1996

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, March 19, 1996, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division, No. 0442-8 DEC. TERM 1994

BEFORE: McEWEN, P.J., DEL SOLE, KELLY, POPOVICH, FORD ELLIOTT, JOYCE, ORIE MELVIN, MUSMANNO and SCHILLER, JJ.

### JUDGMENT

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of PHILADELPHIA County be, and the same is hereby AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ [Illegible] PROTHONOTARY

Dated:OCTOBER 23, 1998

#### J.A45022/97-J.A45027/97-3

Commonwealth v. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Pinero, N. .

Commonwealth v. PHILADELPHIA 1996 – Rienzi, A. 1194, 1281, 1324, 1325,

Commonwealth v. : 1425 & 1470

Alexander, D. Commonwealth v.

Johnson, C. :

Commonwealth v. Khathavong, B.

BEFORE: CAVANAUGH, SCHILLER, AND MON-TEMURO\*, J.J.

#### JUDGMENT

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of PHILADELPHIA County be, and the same is hereby AFFIRMED AS TO PHILADELPHIA, 1996 – 1194, 1281, 1324, 1325 and 1470. VACATED AND REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS; JURISDICTION RELINQUISHED AS TO PHILADELPHIA, 1996 – 1425.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ [Illegible]
PROTHONOTARY

Dated:DECEMBER 16, 1997

#### EXHIBIT E

[362] will argue some other time.

THE COURT: One thing is absolutely clear here: The jury did not convict him with regard to Mr. Stuber.

MR. GASKINS: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The only convictions here, in this entire case, from this same jury were as to Mr. Polec. So, as to whether it was Conspiracy to commit Aggravated Assault, or Conspiracy to commit Murder, I may have a question, but there is no question, given the fact that they came back with a not guilty as to Mr. Stuber – there is no question that the Conspiracy applies, at a minimum, to Aggravated Assault, F-1. There is no question of that.

MR. GASKINS: I accept the position, there is no question, although I have innumerable questions concerning that.

In any event, after having listened to you, and after having listened to the witnesses, and having heard you indicate that the Defendants in this case were given whatever breaks they were going to get by the jury, and after having listened to your sentences, I would point out that I have any one of a number of witnesses in

# [ILLEGIBLE] CENTRAL REPOSITORY 1800 ELMERTON AVENUE HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA 17110 (717) 787-9092

COMPILED: 01/17/2007 PAGE: 1

USE OF THE FOLLOWING CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD FOR \*\*\* SID/225-14-02-4 \*\*\* REGULATED BY ACT 47, AS AMENDED.

#### III - SINGLE STATE OFFENDER

DOB: xx/xx/xxxx SEX: M RAC: B

SOC: xxx-xx-xxxx FBI: 823223WA1

NAME: JOHNSON, CARLO EBON OTN: E964623-2
ARRESTED: 07/31/1994 PA0460100 ABINGTON
TWP PD OCA: A12101
DISPOSITION DATE: 11/21/1994
DISTRICT JUSTICE: 38105

07/31/1994 CC2701A1 SIMPLE AS-SAULT – M2 QUASHED/ DISMIS/ DEMUR SUS 07/31/1994 CC2709^1 HARASS- QUASHED/

MENT - S DISMIS/ DEMUR SUS

07/31/1994 CC2709A3 HARASS- QUASHED/ MENT – S DISMIS/ DEMUR SUS

07/31/1994 CC5503A1 DISORDERLY QUASHED/ CONDUCT – DISMIS/ M3 DEMUR SUS

07/31/1994 CC5503A4 DISORDERLY QUASHED/ CONDUCT - DISMIS/ M3 DEMUR SUS
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
NAME: JOHNSON, CARLO OTN: M634935-0 ARRESTED: 12/02/1994 PAPEP0000 PHILADELPHIA PD OCA: C803538 DISPOSITION DATE: 03/19/1996 COMMON PLEAS DOCKET: CP9412-0442
11/11/1994 CC2702 AGGRAVATED FOUND NOT ASSAULT – F1 GUILTY
11/11/1994 CC2701A SIMPLE AS- SAULT – M2 PROSSED/ WITHDRAWN
11/11/1994 CC2705 RECKLESSLY FOUND NOT ENDANGERING GUILTY ANOTHER – M2
11/11/1994 CC907A POSSESSION NOLLE INSTRUMENT PROSSED/ OF CRIME WITHDRAWN 002 CTS - M1
11/11/1994 CC903 CRIMINAL CON-FOUND NOT SPIRACY – F2 GUILTY
11/11/1994 CC0903 CRIMINAL FOUND GUILTY CONSPIRACY/ REGIONAL AGGRAVATED CORRECTION
$\begin{array}{ccc} ASSAULT & 05 \ YRS - 10 \\ (CC2702) - F2 & YRS \ FINES \\ AND \ COSTS \end{array}$
11/11/1994 CC2502 MURDER FOUND NOT GUILTY
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
F = FELONY, M = MISDEMEANOR, S = SUMMARY

AND THE NUMERIC = THE DEGREE.

ARREST(S) SUPPORTED BY FINGERPRINT CARD(S) ON FILE.

RESPONSE BASED ON COMPARISON OF REQUESTER FURNISHED INFORMATION AND/OR FINGERPRINTS AGAINST A NAME INDEX AND/OR FINGERPRINTS CONTAINED IN THE FILES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE CENTRAL REPOSITORY ONLY, AND DOES NOT

\* \* \*

#### [LOGO] CITY OF PHILADELPHIA PRISONS CLASSIFICATION, MOVEMENT & REGISTRATION 7901 STATE ROAD, PHILA., PA 19136

Robert J. Durison Director

Brian Fallen, Captain Population Control Unit

Carlos O. Sesto, Sergeant Chief Registrar

Inmate Records
State Correctional Institution
at Mahanoy
301 Morea Rd.
Frackville, PA 17932
Atten: Edward Martin, RS

Rosemarie O'Connor, Lieutenant Movement Coordinator

Christopher Thomas Interim Classification Coor.

Re: Carlo Johnson CY-8736 CP 94-12-0442 FID #803-538 Dear Mr. Martin:

Enclosed find corrected, sealed custody check memorandum on the above case.

Mr. Johnson was initially given incorrect presentence credit on Judge Greenspan's sentence of 3-19-96. He is entitled to presentence credit from his arrest date of 12-2-94 to 12-6-94; from 12-9-94 to 7-7-95; & from 2-5-96 to 3-15-96. He was sentenced and reimprisoned 3-19-96.

A sealed copy of this memorandum is being forwarded to the Philadelphia Clerk of Quarter Sessions Office. Records Staff who note any discrepancies in what I have sent can call me. Inmates who dispute my calculations should contact their attorneys: they should not write to me.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Robert J. Durison Robert J. Durison Dir. – CMR Tel. 215-685-8487

RJD/pd

Enclosures

cc: Francine Nicolucci, Clerk of Quarter Sessions Carlo Johnson, CY-8736, SCI Mahanoy File DC-16D

# SENTENCE STATUS SUMMARY COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

#### 1. SENTENCE SUMMARY

Class of Sentence

☐ DEFINITE ☑ INDEFINITE ☐ GENERAL ☐ LIFE ☐ COMMUTED LIFE ☐ EXECUTION
Date 3-19-96 County PHILADELPHIA
Number, Term Court, Indictment <u>CP0442; 12/94</u>
Type Sent
Minimum Y 5 M D Maximum Y 10 M D
Judge JANE GREENSPAN
Offense CR. CONSP./AGG. ASLT.
Offense Tracking Number M63493
Continued From DC#
Plea NOT GUILTY
Total Sentence:  Minimum Y 5 M D Maximum Y 10 M D
Commitment Credit SEE REMARKS
Fines Costs Restitution
Summary or Remarks on Sentence CREDIT: XXX 12-3-94 TO 12-6-95. Credit adjusted 9/23/99 as per letter from Mr. Durison in Philadelphia as follows
12/2/94 to 12/6/94; 12/9/94 to 7/7/95 and 2/5/96 to 3/16/96.

## 2. DATES SECTION

[Boxed Area	Was	Crossed	Out In	This Area]

[Donou I Lou Was	or obboda o a	in Timbin ca,	
Item	Original	Change #1	Change #2
DATE OF RECEPTION	03-22-96	03-22-96	3-22-96
EFFECTIVE DATE	08-20-95	03-16-95	07-10-95
EXPIRATION OF MINIMUM	08-20-2000	03-16-2000	07-10-2000
EXPIRATION OF MAXIMUM	08-20-2005	03-16-2005	07-10-2005
EFFECTIVE DATE – PV	XXXXX		
DELINQUENT TIME	XXXXX		
BACKTIME	XXXXX		
NEW MAXI- MUM – PV	XXXXX		
SENTENCE CHANGE	XXXXX	04-19-96	09-23-99
BASIS FOR CHANGE	XXXXX	CORRECTED CREDIT	Adjusted Credit
NEW SENTENCE	XXXXX		<u>5Y - 10Y</u>
1st Release: M	ethod - Inst		
2nd Release: M	Method - Inst	t. – Date	
3rd Release: M	Iethod – Inst	. – Date	
4th Release: M	lethod – Inst	. – Date	

#### REFERENCES AND IDENTIFICATION 3. 1st Admission: Inst. - Date AC/EDCC 3-22-96 2nd Admission: Inst. - Date TRN/CDCC 4-5-96 3rd Admission: Inst. - Date SCI Mahanoy 7-19-96 4th Admission: Inst. - Date Prosecuting Police Department PHILADELPHIA CTY PD Place of Birth PHILADELPHIA, PA Date of Birth 11-14-75 Marital Status SIN. DC Number CY-8736 R-S B/M PBPP Number SID Number 2251402-4 Name JOHNSON, CARLO ☐ ALIAS □ TN

#### FORM DC-23B

#### SENTENCE STATUS CHANGE REPORT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
INSTITUTIONAL NUMBER CY-8736
PBP NUMBER
COMMITMENT NAME JOHNSON, Carlo SID: 22514024
INSTITUTION Mah[o]n[e]y
DATE OF REPORT 9/23/99
A SENTENCE STATUS CHANGE REPORT IS SUBMITTED ON THE ABOVE INMATE, AS INDI- CATED BY THE CHECKED SECTION(S)
x⊠ 1. THE SENTENCE WHICH THIS INMATE IS CURRENTLY UNDERGOING IS AS FOLLOWS:
SENTENCE $5Y - 10Y$
EFFECTIVE DATE 3-16-95
EFFECTIVE DATE-PV
MINIMUM DATE 3-16-2000
MAXIMUM DATE <u>3-16-2005</u>
BACKTIME IF PV
PV MAXIMUM DATE
OFFENSE(S) Crim Consp Aggravated Assault
COURT – INDICTMENT NUMBER – TERM <u>CP# 9412-0442</u>
COUNTY Philadelphia
REMARKS

 ■ 2. THE SENTENCE WHICH THIS INMATE IS CURRENTLY UNDERGOING IS CHANGED AS FOLLOWS:

TYPE OF CHANGE
$\square$ OVERLAPPING CONCURRENT SENT.
☐ UNDERLAPPING CONCURRENT SENT.
☐ RECONSIDERED SENTENCE
□ CORRECTED COMMITMENT
□ COMMUTED SENTENCE
⊠⊠ RECOMPUTED SENTENCE
SENTENCE <u>5Y - 10Y</u>
EFFECTIVE DATE 7-10-95
EFFECTIVE DATE-PV
MINIMUM DATE <u>7-10-2000</u>
MAXIMUM DATE <u>7-10-2005</u>
BACKTIME IF PV
PV MAXIMUM DATE
PROSECUTING POLICE DEPARTMENT Philadelphia PD
JUDGE Greenspan
DATE OF SENTENCE 3-19-96
PLEA ESCAPE TIME
OFFENSE(S) Crim Consp Aggravated Assault
COURT – INDICTMENT NUMBER – TERM <u>CP# 9412-0442</u>
COUNTY Philadelphia

# REMARKS Credit adjusted per Mr. Robert Durison - See item 7 □ 3. FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF THIS IN-MATE'S CURRENT SENTENCE, HE WILL BE REENTERED TO SERVE THE FOLLOWING: SENTENCE \_\_\_\_ JUDGE \_\_\_\_ DATE OF SENTENCE PLEA REENTER AT OFFENSE(S) COURT - INDICTMENT NUMBER - TERM COUNTY \_\_\_\_ REMARKS □ 4. A DETAINER HAS BEEN LODGED AGAINST THIS INMATE AS FOLLOWS: (PLEASE SEE OVER) FROM (INCLUDING ADDRESS) CHARGING DETAINER DATE INDICTMENT-WARRANT NOS. REMARKS □ 5. A DETAINER PREVIOUSLY LODGED AGAINST THIS INMATE HAS BEEN DROPPED AS FOLLOWS: FROM (INCLUDING ADDRESS) CHARGING \_\_\_\_\_

DETAINER DATE	
INDICTMENT-WARRANT NOS.	
METHOD OF DISPOSITION	
REMARKS	
☐ 6. YOUR APPLICATION FOR COMMUTATION HAS BEEN REVIEWED BY THE BOARD OF PARDONS, AND IT WAS:	
☐ GRANTED – SEE SECTION #2 ABOVE	
□ CONTINUED	
□ REFUSED	
☐ HELD UNDER ADVISEMENT	
□ WITHDRAWN	
□ PASSED	
☑ 7. Previous credit was 12-3-94 to 12-6-95. Per letter from Mr. Dusirson dated 9-17-99 credit on this case was changed. Credit for time served 12-2-94 to 12-6-94, 12-9-94 to 7-7-95 and 2-5-96 to 3-15-96.	it
RECORD OFFICER'S SIGNATURE RECORD OFFICER'S NAME	
/s/ Edward R. Martin  Edward R. Martin,  Records Supervisor	
WHITE - Inmate's Copy CANARY - PBP'S Copy BLUE - BCI'S Copy GREEN - Institution Distribution Copy (See over WHITE - DC-15 IRJ Copy	y

[LOGO]

#### COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT MAHANOY

301 Morea Road Frackville, PA 17932 (570) 773-2158

JEFFREY A. BEARD, Ph.D. ROBERT D. SHANNC Secretary Superintendent

DENNIS R. ERHARD Deputy Secretary Eastern Region ANTHONY L. PETRUC Deputy Superintendent for Facilities Management

EDGAR M. KNEISS Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Services

DATE: June 26, 2001

To Whom It May Concern:

Please consider this as appropriate identification for Carlo Johnson to cash check number 48100 in the amount of \$31.77

Mr. <u>Johnson</u> was recently released from this facility and has no other means of identification.

Any questions, please contact me at 570/773-2158 ext. 412. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Patrice A. Pavlik Inmate Accounts